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PERKINS COlE LLP 
251 East Front Street, Suite 400 
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Telephone: 208.343.3434 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
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CANYON CO~~CLERK 
fV~"'PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and 




JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT 
(husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICATIONIMOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: PLAINTIFFS' DECLARATORY 
CLAIM FOR AN IMPLIED EASEMENT 
Defendants John R. Scott and Jackie G. Scott ("Defendants"), by and through their 
attorneys of record, Perkins Coie LLP, hereby move this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) and the authority cited in Defendants memorandum in support ofthis Motion 
filed contemporaneously herewith for the entry of an order prohibiting Plaintiffs fro~n making 
any argument or presenting any instructions to the jury that they jury is entitled to making any 
findings or conclusions on the ultimate issue of whether or not Plaintiffs are entitled to an 
implied easement. This issue must be determined by the Court in light of the fact that Plaintiffs' 
implied easement claim is part of their equitable claim for a declaratory judgment. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
CLARIFICA TIONIMOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
PLAINTIFFS' DEC LARA TORY CLAIM FOR AN 
IMPLIED EASEMENT - 1 
65685-0001/LEGALI4627044.1 000333 
I • 
This Motion is supported by the files and records herein and the memorandum in support 
filed concurrently herewith. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED: August 29,2008. 
PERKINS COlE LLP 
By __ ~~~~~~~ __ ~ ______ __ 
Shell 
Cyn ia . Yee-Wallace, Of the Firm 
Atto n s for Defondants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on August 29,2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated below, 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
10 1 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Fl. 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
FAX: 385-5384 
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Telephone (208) 345-2000 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE I. 




MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
IMPLIED EASEMENT 
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
COME NOW plaintiffs Charles E. Bratton and Marjorie 1. Bratton (collectively 
"Brattons"), by and through undersigned counsel of record, and hereby submit this Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Implied Easement. Pursuant to this Court's requests, the following 
memorandum is submitted to demonstrate that the Brattons are able to establish aprima[acie 
case of implied easement. As discussed more fully below, the implied easement is statutorily 
implied, as well as also complying with valid and controlling Idaho case law. 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF IMPLIED EASEMENT - 1 
000335 
Client:991493.1 
VVI' V.LI "VVU 
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I. FACTUAL mSTORY AND USE OF DITCH AND EASEMENT 
On April 19, 1973, Mr. Bratton purchased Lot 32, easement on Lot 40 as 
described above, and share of water rights. See, 2 of the Affidavit of Charles Bratton. Mr. Ford 
conveyed Lot 32 to the Brattons by way of an executed Warranty Deed. See Exhibit "A" of the 
Affidavit of Charles Bratton in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The property was purchased with an irrigation easement and water shares and an irrigation ditch 
was placed on Lot 40 soon after the purchase. See' 5 of the Affidavit of Charles Bratton. The 
1973 ditch was placed pursuant to the easement and supplied water to the Bratton property. See 
Affidavit of Charles Bratton. 
The Warranty Deed from Ford to Bratton conveyed 4.83 acres ofland, water 
rights, including a one-half share of water stock held in Canyon Hill Ditch Company and another 
one-half share in Middleton Mill Ditch Company. See Exhibit "A" of the Affidavit of Charles 
Bratton, supra. In addition, the Warranty Deed gave an express easement for the construction 
and maintenance of an irrigation ditch, with rights of ingress and egress. See Exhibit "A" of the 
Affidavit of Charles Bratton. Pursuant to the easement, in 1973 the ditch was dug on the 
irrigation easement, was three feet in width, and far away enough from the fence to turn a tractor 
around and traversed Lot 40. See' 5 of the Affidavit of Charles Bratton and Harold Ford. 
The irrigation ditch on Lot 40 was dug as soon as was practical in the spring of 
1973, shortly following the conveyance of Lot 32 to the Brattons. See Mfidavit of Charles 
Bratton. That spring, the Brattons began to use and maintain their easement and ditch on Lot 40. 
Following placement of the ditch, Bratton had his property tilled and Lot 32 was planted in 
pasture. He also built a fence and had ditches dug on Lot 32. The ditch was used to irrigate the 
Bratton property located on Lot 32. See, 6 of the Affidavit of Charles Bratton. Since 1973, the 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF IMPLIED EASEMENT - 2 
336 
Client991493.1 
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Brattons continually utilized and maintained the structure of the ditch as well as the easement 
area on either side of the ditch. See, 7 of the Affidavit of Charles Bratton. From 1973 to 1978, 
the Brattons placed sections of concrete pipe intermittently in the lower part of the ditch to keep 
its walls from eroding and to control the volume of water. See, 5 of the Affidavit of Charles 
Bratton. By 1978, Bratton had also placed a 20-foot galvanized pipe from the mid-point ofthe 
ditch down to where the cement pipe began. 
The Brattons' use and maintenance of the ditch involved utilizing a tractor to 
clean out the upper portion of the ditch and also maintain both sides of the ditch. This 
maintenance was within a 12-foot area inclusive of the three-foot ditch. See' 7 of the Affidavit 
of Charles Bratton. The Brattons accessed Lot 40 through an area adjacent to the ditch for 
tractors and other equipment needed to maintain the ditch. See 19 of the Mfidavit of Charles 
Bratton. Every spring since 1973, Mr. Bratton sprayed and burned the ditch and ditch banks. 
See' 7 ofthe Affidavit of Charles Bratton. 
On September 13,2005, Rawlinson gift deeded Lot 40 to the Scotts. This Gift 
Deed specifically states that the Scotts took their property: 
[T]ogether with all tenements, hereditaments, water, water rights, 
ditches, ditch rights, easements and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging or in anywise appertaining, and subject to any 
encumbrances or easements as appear of record or by use upon 
such property. 
See Exhibit "An and 1 2 of the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
In 2007, Mr. Bratton accessed his ditch in the usual and routine manner and 
proceeded to perfonn the usual maintenance, to include spraying and burning the ditch as well as 
spraying and burning the areas adjacent to the ditch in preparation to receive water during the 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF IMPLIED EASEMENT - 3 
000337 
Cllent991493.1 
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2007 irrigation season. See 1 1 7 and 11 of the Mfidavit of Charles Bratton. This annual spring 
maintenance was needed, and was the customary practice by the Brattons for 34 years. See 1 11 
of the Affidavit of Charles Bratton. 
II. NOTICE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS 
Importantly, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure establish a system of notice 
pleading. Under this system of pleading, a plaintiff does not need to include a great deal of 
particularity in a Complaint. Rather, a plaintiff only needs to allege facts and claims sufficient 
for a defendant to understand the claim that has been alleged against them. See Cook v. Skyline 
Corp., 135 Idaho 26,34, 13 P.3d 857, 865 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). Discussing Idaho's notice 
pleading requirements, the court in Cook, supra, stated, "[ n ]otice pleading frees the parties from 
pleading particular issues or theories, and allows parties to get through the courthouse door by 
merely stating claims upon which relief can be granted." Id. 
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court in Vendelin v. Costeo Wholesale Corp., 
104 Idaho 416, 427, 95 P.3d 34,45 (2004), stated: "With the advent of notice pleading, a party is 
no longer slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings. Rather, a complaint need 
only state claims upon which relief may be granted. . .. The emphasis ... i!? to insure that a just 
result is accomplished, rather than requiring strict adherence to rigid forms of 
pleading."( emphasis added) 
In this case, plaintiffs have appropriately satisfied the requirements under a notice 
pleading requirement that an express and/or implied easement was at issue. That is, the 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed with this Court on January 14,2008, sets 
forth that an express easement was granted that required at least 12 feet to accommodate and that 
the Brattons continuously used such waterway since 1973. See Amended Complaint, 11 11, 13, 
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and 28. The property, when received by the Scotts, was encumbered by the easement as set forth 
in the Gift Deed. See Amended Complaint" 14. The Scotts interfered with Bratton's use and 
then ultimately destroyed the existing ditch. See Amended Complaint, ft 17 and 20. As 
supported by the evidence, defendants have had notice of these allegations and plaintiffs should 
be permitted to proceed to trial on the issue of whether an implied easement existed. 
III. ALL IDAHO CODE APPLICABLE SECTIONS 
Idaho recognizes the importance that water and irrigation plays by enacting 
specific legislation regarding water and irrigation rights. Various statutes set forth the applicable 
law in both the scope and governance of such rights. 
The Idaho Legislature recognized that a ditch owner must be permitted to clean, 
maintain, and repair a ditch or canal. l See Idaho Code § 42-1102. As such, a ditch owner is 
granted an easement, i.e., a right-of-way, to enter land "to properly do the work of cleaning, 
maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit with personnel and with such equipment 
as is commonly used, or reasonably adapted, to that work." Id. (emphasis added). Recognizing 
1 Idaho law does not expressly define the term "ditch owner." However, Idaho case law 
implies that a ditch owner is an individual or entity with an interest in the water of a particular 
ditch or canal. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 857, 55 P.3d 304, 311 (2002) 
(citing Reynolds Irrigation Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P .2d 774 (1948). As a ditch 
owner, an individual or entity is entitled to an easement across the land of others to transport its 
irrigation water. Ramseyer v. Jamerson, 78 Idaho 504, 511, 305 P .2d 1088, 1093 (1957). The 
Supreme Court of Idaho has provided that "[i]t is well established in this jurisdiction that an 
easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with 
the general use of the property by the owner." Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 
544,549-50,808 P.2d 1289,1294-95 (1991) (citing Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 
952 (1961». A ditch owner also has a "secondary easement with rights of ingress and egress for 
the purpose of maintenance ... and the regulation of his water." Ramseyer, 78 Idaho at 511,305 
P.2d at 1093. The "cleaning, maintaining, and repairing" of a canal or ditch to ensure the proper 
transportation of water is considered within the scope of a maintenance easement. Nampa & 
Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001); see also IDAHO 
CODE § 42-1102. 
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the importance of cleaning and maintaining a ditch, a ditch owner is permitted sufficient width to 
properly effect the necessary cleaning, maintenance, or repairs. Id. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 
further states that: 
The existence of a visible ditch, canal or conduit shall constitute 
notice to the owner, or any subsequent purchaser, of the 
underlaying servient estate, that the owner of the ditch, canal or 
conduit has the right-of-way and incidental rights confirmed or 
granted by this section. 
(Emphasis added). 
Idaho Code Sections 42-1202 and 42-1203 mandate maintenance of a ditch and 
ditch embankments. However, a ditch owner has the responsibility care for a ditch in such a 
manner so as to not injure another property. Idaho Code § 42-1204. The failure to properly do 
so may result in liability for the ditch owner for damage caused to others. See id. As such, any 
irrigation easement, i.e., express, implied, or prescriptive, implementing a ditch, canal, or 
conduit, must further comply with these state mandates. 
Therefore, pursuant to Idaho Law, an easement for an irrigation ditch allows for 
enough room on each side of the ditch to maintain the ditch and allow ingress and egress of 
machinery necessary for maintenance. As such, the Bratton ditch was three feet in width, plus 
having enough room on either side for the ingress and egress of a six-foot tractor and ditcher 
without interference with the fence would allow for the inside edge of the ditch located at least 
four to five feet from the fence. Further, a tractor and ditcher cannot be turned around in an area 
less than 12 feet. 
IV. EXPRESS EASEMENT 
An easement may arise by way of a written document, such as a provision 
contained within a warranty deed, whereby the grantor of property provides the owner of the 
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dominant tenement a right of use benefitting the granted property and burdening the retained 
property. See, e.g., Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948,952 (1976). The owner of 
such an easement is entitled to the full use and enjoyment of his or her easement. See McKay v. 
Boise Project Board of Control, 141 Idaho 463, 471, 111 P.3d 148, 156 (2005); Carson v. Elliott, 
111 Idaho 889 .• 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (CLApp. 1986). An easement owner's rights are 
paramount to those of the owner of the servient tenement. See id. (citing Boydston Beach Assoc. 
v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370,376-77, 7213 P.2d 914, 920-21 (CLApp. 1986». The express easement, 
granting irrigation rights must further comply with Idaho law regarding maintenance, cleaning 
and the right-of-way granted to effect such cleaning. 
V. IDAHO CODE 42-1207 - DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING DITCHES 
It is important to note that Idaho Code Section 42-1207 specifically precludes the 
destruction of existing ditches. Indeed, where a change to the placement of a ditch is desired, 
"[ t]he written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit 
mustfirst be obtained before it is changed or placed in buried pipe by the landowner." IDAHO 
CODE § 42-1207 (emphasis added). Moreover, where changes to the ditch are desired, the costs 
are to be borne by the landowner, not the ditch owner: 
A landowner shall have the right to direct that the conduit be 
relocated to a different route than the route of the ditch, canal, 
lateral or drain, provided that the landowner shall agree in 
writing to be responsible for any increased construction or future 
maintenance costs necessitated by said relocation. 
Id. (emphasis added). As such, the Scotts violated Section 12-1207 by destroying the ditch 
without the Brattons' written permission. Further, Idaho Code Sections 42-1202 through 42-
1204 specifically mandates that a ditch owner maintain "in good order and repair" the ditch and 
ditch embankments. The legislature recognized that sufficient space was necessary to properly 
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maintain and clean a ditch and ditch embankments. See IDAHO CODE § 42-1102. Accordingly, 
Idaho Code Section 42-1102 provides a right-of-way with sufficient width along the banks of the 
ditch to properly effect the necessary maintenance and cleaning. 
VI. IMPLIED EASEMENT BY CASE LAW AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The ditch was constructed in the Spring of 1973. See Affidavit of Charles 
Bratton. A three-foot-wide irrigation ditch was placed at least six feet from the property line on 
Lot 40 with sufficient space on both sides of the ditch to maintain, clean and repair the irrigation 
ditch. See' 7 of the Affidavit of Charles Bratton. The ditch has been in its present location for 
34 years and has been continually used by the Brattons for that same period of time. See" 7 
and 9 of the Affidavit of Charles Bratton. Mr. Bratton accessed his easement and proceeded to 
perform the usual maintenance, to include spraying and burning the ditch as well as spraying and 
burning the areas adjacent to the ditch within the 12-foot-wide easement area, in the spring in 
preparation to receiving water duringthe 2007 irrigation season. See" 7 and 11 of the Affidavit 
of Charles Bratton. 
These facts are not in dispute. Idaho law recognizes that implied easements may 
be created by prior use. See Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 362, 368 (1999); 
Phillips Indus.} Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 P.2d 706, 71 I (Ct. App. 1992). Idaho 
recognizes two distinct methods for establishing an implied easement. The first is set forth in 
Davis, 133 Idaho at 643,991 P.2d at 368, which requires: 
(1) unity oftitle or ownership and subsequent separation by grant 
of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough 
before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was 
intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably 
necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
Id. at 642, 991 P.2d at 367. 
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The second method was fIrst promulgated in Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 360 
P.2d 403 (1961), and requires: 
(1) unity oftitle or ownership and subsequent separation by grant 
of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous user; [and] (3) the 
easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of 
the dominant estate. 
Id. at 210.991 P.2d at 407 (emphasis added). The Davis method was favorably cited in Davis 
v. Peacock and remains valid authority today. See Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 501 P.2d 
1383 (1972); Phillips Indus., Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 699, 827 P.2d 706, 711 (Ct. App. 
1992). In fact, several courts have recognized the validity of the Gowen language in determining 
the existence of an implied easement. Id. In Close, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: H[ e ]ven 
though the phraseology of the requirements as set out in Davis v. Gowen, ... is somewhat 
different ... the same principles are involved." Close, 95 Idaho at 76, 501 P.2d at 1387. See 
also Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770,554 P.2d 948 (1976). (emphasis added) 
As this Court has made clear, it is the second prong ofthe Davis v. Peacock 
holding: i.e., (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate 
to show that the use was intended to be permanent; that has caused the Court to question the 
basis of implied easement. However, under the Gowen method ofdeterrnining an implied 
easement, the Brattons have continuously used the ditch and associated easement since 1973; 
shortly following the execution ofthe Warranty Deed. As such, the Brattons can establish an 
implied easement through the traditional elements set forth in Gowen. 
Further, it is important to note one difference between an implied easement for 
irrigation systems and those for other reasons. In Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 
Idaho 544. 808 P.2d 1289 (1991), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that where a ditch 
easement necessarily includes applicable state law, such as the explicit requirement that a ditch 
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owner maintain and clean a ditch and ditch embankments. As such, when considering an 
irrigation easement, as here, regard for state law requirements must be given. Conversely, in 
Peacock, the case revolves around a road easement, not an irrigation system. The reason that the 
distinction is so important is because there are specific. statutory protections for irrigation 
systems, which statutes do not apply to other easements. Due to the protection statutes for 
irrigation systems, reliance on the elements set forth in either Gowen or Davis is not required for 
the Brattons to demonstrate a valid implied easement. Based on Gowen and the facts as well as 
statutes set forth under §§ 1-4, Brattons have an implied easement by law. 
VII. SCOTTS' GIFT DEED 
Additionally, the Scotts Gift Deed comes into play. Idaho law has created a 
statutory implied easement where a purchaser of land has notice of a ditch: 
The existence of a visible ditch, canal or conduit shall constitute 
notice to the owner, or any subsequent purchaser, of the underlying 
servient estate, that the owner of the ditch, canal or conduit has the 
right-of-way and incidental rights confirmed or granted by this 
section. 
IDAHO CODE § 42-1102.2 
2 Idaho law does not expressly define the term "ditch owner." However, Idaho case law implies 
that a ditch owner is an individual or entity with an interest in the water of a particular ditch or 
canal. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 857, 55 P.3d 304,311 (2002) (citing 
Reynolds Irrigation Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1948). As a ditch owner, an 
individual or entity is entitled to an easement across the land of others to transport its irrigation 
water. Ramseyer v. Jamerson, 78 Idaho 504, 511, 305 P.2d 1088, 1093 (1957). The Supreme 
Court of Idaho has provided that "[i]t is well established in this jurisdiction that an easement is 
the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general 
use of the property by the owner." Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 
549-50,808 P.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1991) (citing Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952 
(1961». A ditch owner also has a "secondary easement with rights of ingress and egress for the 
purpose of maintenance ... and the regulation of his water." Ramseyer, 78 Idaho at 511, 305 
P.2d at 1093. The "cleaning, maintaining, and repairing" of a canal or ditch to ensure the proper 
transportation of water is considered within the scope of a maintenance easement. Nampa & 
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In 2005, when the Gift Deed was executed to the Scotts, the ditch was in plain, 
open and obvious use. See Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 9, Gift Deed dated September 13, 2005. This 
fact is uncontested. In fact, John Scott watched Mr. Bratton irrigate by use of the ditch. It was 
only in 2007 after the Scotts (1) threatened Mr. Bratton while he was cleaning and maintaining 
his ditch; (2) placed No Trespassing signs; (3) continued to threaten Mr. Bratton when he tried to 
irrigate; and (4) destroyed the ditch, that this litigation ensued. See 1 14 of the Affidavit of 
Charles Bratton. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-1102, where a subsequent purchaser can 
visibly identify the ditch, the visible nature of the ditch is sufficient notice to inform the 
purchaser of the implied easement. In this case, that ditch has been visible for 34 years and has 
been continuously used for that same period. Indeed, the Brattons have continually conducted 
cleaning and maintenance on the ditch, as well as clearing the ditch of debris pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sections 42-1102 and 42-1204. In fact, Idaho courts have recognized and confirmed the 
statutory right of a ditch owner to clean, maintain and repair a ditch as part of the easement 
rights. The ditch owner has a "secondary easement with rights of ingress and egress for the 
purpose of maintenance ... and the regulation of his water." Ramseyer v. Jamerson, 78 Idaho 
504,511,305 P.2d 1088, 1093 (1957). The "cleaning, maintaining, and repairing" ofa ditch is 
to ensure the proper transportation of water and is considered within the scope of a maintenance 
easement. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518,20 P.3d 702 
(2001); see also IDAHO CODE § 42-1102. Based on the visible nature ofthe ditch, Scotts have 
been on notice of the ditch and all incidental rights set forth by the statutes cited above. 
Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Wash. Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001); see also IDAHO 
CODE § 42-1102. 
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The Scotts' Gift Deed further confinns the existence ofthe implied easement. As 
mentioned, the deed contains the following language informing the Scotts that their property was 
subjected to certain encumbrances and easements: 
The following described premises, to-wit: 
together with all tenements, hereditaments, water, water rights, 
ditches, ditch rights, easements and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging or in anywise appertaining, and subject to any 
encumbrances or easements as appear of record or by use upon 
such property. 
See Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit 9, Gift Deed dated September 13,2005 (emphasis added). The 
Scotts have had notice of the existing ditch easement byway of its visible nature, but also the 
Gift Deed contained explicit language confirming said ditch and easement and that the property 
was subject to that ditch easement. Accordingly, the Gift Deed also confinns the statutorily 
implied easement. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementioned, plaintiffs respectfully submit that they can establish 
a prima faCie case of an implied easement, statutorily implied easement, express easement with 
statutory protection, statutory easement by use and destruction of existing ditch. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court permit them to present their case to the jury without 
bifurcation as required by IRCP Rule 38, Idaho Constitution, and as demanded by Plaintiffs in 
their Amended Complaint of January 14,2008. 
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MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;II" day of September, 2008, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF IMPLIED EASEMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Shelly H. Cozakos 
PERKINS, COTE, L.L.P. 
251 E. Front St., Suite 400 
P.O. Box 737 
Boise, ID 83701-0737 
Facsimile (208) 343-3232 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( t-fFacsirnile 
Nan J. arrett 
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Shelly H. Cozakos, Bar No. 5374 
SCozakos@perkinscoie.com 
CynthiaL. Yee-Wallace, BarNo. 6793 
CYee Wallace@perkinscoie.com 
PERKINS COlE LLP 
251 East Front Street, Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702-7310 
Telephone: 208.343.3434 
Facsimile: 208.343.3232 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and 




JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT 
(husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821 C 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM RE: IMPLIED 
EASEMENT 
Defendants John R. Scott and Jackie G. Scott, (the "Scotts" or "Defendants"), by and 
through their attorneys of record, Perkins Coie LLP, submit the following response to Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Implied Easement filed with the Court on September 2, 
2008. 
Plaintiffs argue they can admit evidence regarding their use of the easement and use of 
~002 
Defendants" property surrounding the easement at trial .. Plaintiffs' further argue that this Court 
should disregard the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent instructions and case law with respect to 
DEfENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
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the requisite elements for an implied easement based upon prior use. Plaintiffs' argument is 
misguided. The Thomas v. Madsen opinion gives this Court and the parties' clear directions on 
what Plaintiffs must prove in order to establish an implied easement based upon prior use. This 
opinion cannot be ignored in order to allow Plaintiffs to admit evidence that is improper. 
Plaintiffs further argue that the intent of the parties, namely Harold Ford and the Brattons, 
is somehow relevant to their claim for an implied easement. However, in Phillips Industries, 
Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 827 P.2d 706 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court made clear that 
the scope of inquiry into the parties intent is limited by the general; rule that if a deed is plain and 
unambiguous, the parties intent must be ascertained only from the deed itself. Pirol evidence is 
therefore inadmissible. Id, 121 Idaho at 697. 
Likewise, in Benninger v. Derijield, 142 Idaho 486, 129 P.3d 1235 (2006), the court 
stated as follows, "If the language of the deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the 
parties must be ascertained from the deed itself and extrinsic evidence is not admissible." Id, 
142 Idaho at 489. 
The warranty deed at issue in this case is clear and unambiguous. It precisely sets forth 
the parameters of the expressed easement present on the Scotts' property. As such, Plaintiffs 
should not be allowed to present any evidence regarding intent of Harold Ford and the Brattons, 
of the scope, location and measurements of the easement. 
DATED: September 2, 2008. PERKINS COlE LLP 
BY~~~ 
~('Shelly H. Cozak~ ,Of the Firm 
. Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on August 29, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated below, 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Fl. 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ill 83701 
FAX; 385-5384 
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. T. CRAWFORD. Dl=:PUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and 




JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT 
(husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' THIRD 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IRRELEVANT 
AND PROHIBITED PROPENSITY 
EVIDENCE 
This matter, having come regularly before the Court on September 2, 2008 for oral 
argument upon Defendants' Third Motion in Limine Re: Irrelevant and Prohibited Propensity 
Evidence, the parties appearing through their counsel of record, and the Court having considered 
the arguments by the parties, the authorities cited in the Defendants' memorandum in support of 
the motion, and the authority, reasons and grounds set forth and cited in open court on September 
2, 2008, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants' Third Motion in Limine Re: Irrelevant 
and Prohibited Propensity Evidence is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs, their counsel, 
representatives and witnesses are hereby ordered to refrain from introducing, making, or eliciting 
any evidence, testimony, arguments, objections, or mention at trial regarding any alleged or 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' THIRD MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IRRELEVANT AND PROHIBITED 
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actual altercations or confrontations between either Defendant, John or Jackie Scott, and any 
third-party other than Plaintiffs, including the following: 
1. Steve Wielong: Testimony about "his need for safety from Mr. Scott" and his 
knowledge about "adverse conduct and actions of the Scotts" toward "other neighbors 
with and without easements." Testimony of the following "conduct, behavior, and 
personality" of Mr. Scott, an altercation with Dane Lane, hostility toward the Wielong 
family, erection of cameras, lights, and motions detectors around exterior of house, 
erection of multiple no trespassing signs, installation of locked gates, use of binoculars to 
watch neighbors (other than the Brattons), extreme hostility toward all neighbors, threats 
when Mr. Scott evicted prior owner and hostility toward Wielong pets. Testimony 
regarding how neighbors in the neighborhood used to walk through what is now the Scott 
property, but now refuse to do so due to "fear" of the Scotts; 
2. Dane Lane: Testimony that he owns an easement and that Mr. Scott has tried to 
keep Mr. Lane from turning on his head gate to receive irrigation water and has had 
problems, "to include a verbal altercation" with Mr. Scott regarding use of an easement 
and access to a head gate; 
3. Mike Memmelaar: Testimony that the Scotts "stare at him whenever he is out in 
his field;" 
4. Ryan Finney: Testimony that "he feels very sad that every time he goes out onto 
the property he feels like he is being watched and cannot enjoy any privacy on the 
property;" and 
5. Any prior crimes, convictions, criminal charges, pleas, citations, or admissions of 
criminal violations by either Defendant. 
Plaintiffs shall refrain from introducing, making, or eliciting any evidence, testimony, 
arguments, objections, or mention of the matters described herein directly or indirectly, during 
voir dire, opening statement, interrogation of witnesses, closing statements, or in any other 
manner at trial. 
DATED: September 3,2008. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on September 3, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated 
below, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Fl. 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
FAX: 385-5384 
Shelly H. Cozakos 
Cynthia L. Y ee-Wallace 
PERKINS COlE LLP 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 400 
P.O. Box 737 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Crf~.~_ ~§~ 9M. 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and 
MARJORIE I BRATTON 
(husband and wife), 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE 















We, the Jury, answer the following question: 
-V SEP 0 ~ 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CI..ERK 
S MAUND, OEPUTY 
CASE NO. CV-2007-6821-C 
VERDICT FORM 
Question No.1: Have the Plaintiffs met their burden of proof by 
establishing that they have a 12 foot wide implied easement? 
Answer to Question No.1: 
Yes --
As soon as nine or more of you have agreed on the answer, sign and 
date this Verdict Form and notify the Bailiff. If your answer is unanimous, 
your foreman alone shall sign and date this Verdict Form; but if nine or 
more but less than the entire jury agree, then those so agreeing shall sign this 
Verdict Form. 
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OANYON COUNTY CLERK 
O. BUTLER, DEPlJTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE I. 
BRATTON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHNR. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821 C 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Charles E. Bratton and Marjorie I. Bratton (collectively 
tg] 004/013 
"Bratton"), by and through undersigned counsel of record, and hereby files this motion seeking 
reconsideration of the Court's September 4,2008 ruling from the bench that Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102 does not apply to the consideration of the case at bar. This motion is supported 
by the argument that follows herein. 
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I. 
BACKGROUND 
Earlier this morning, September 4, 2008, the Court heard oral argument from the 
parties concerning the applicability of Idaho Code Section 42-1102,42-1204; and 42-1207. At 
the outset, and prior to argument by counsel, the Court stated that it did not believe that Idaho 
Code Section 42-1102 applied to the consideration of the case at bar. The Court stated that the 
express language of the statute (given its use ofthe term "stream") provides that it only applies 
to situations in which riparian landowners (landowners with frontage on a natural stream or other 
natural body of water) lack sufficient stream frontage to allow the construction ofa gravity-based 
irrigation system. The Court reasoned that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 affords those 
unfortunately situated riparian landowners the opportunity to enter the lands of another (such as 
their immediate neighbor) in order to build a satisfactory irrigation ditch that they could not 
otherwise build on their own property. The Court reasoned that because this case does not 
present a scenario involving the direct conveyance of water from a natural stream, or otherwise 
involve riparian property, Idaho Code Section 42-1102 does not apply. The Court also stated 
that it fails to see how such a decision would prejudice the Brattons because some of the 
concepts encompassed in Idaho Code Section 42-1102 are also encompassed in Idaho Code 
Sections 42-1204 and 42-1207-statutory provisions that the Court does view as applicable in 
this matter. 
Not surprisingly, the Defendants agreed with the Court's rationale, agreeing that 
the plain, unambiguous language of Idaho Code Section 42-1102 contemplates only 
riparian/stream frontage situations, a factual scenario that is not before the Court in the case at 
bar. The Defendants asserted that the Brattons failed to point to any case law interpreting that 
the statute provides otherwise. The Defendants citing to Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. 
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Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518 (2001) and Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 
Idaho 544 (1991) further argued that the express three (3) foot easement granted to the Brattons 
by Mr. Ford governs the scope and purpose of the irrigaiton easement in this matter, and that any 
expansion of that easement would impermissibly and unduly expand the burdens placed upon the 
Defendants'land. 
For the reasons discussed below, the Brattons respectfully disagree with the 
Court's holding that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 does not apply to the consideration of the case 
at bar. The Brattons also contend that failing to apply Idaho Code Section 42-1102 in this matter 
will prejudice their case because while it is true that Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 and 42-1207 
do encompass some of the concepts discussed by Idaho Code Section 42-1102, the Chapter 12 
statutes do not incorporate all of the Chapter 11 concepts that are germane to the Court's and the 
jury's consideration of this matter. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 Applies More Broadly Than the Court Holds 
First, the plain language ofIdaho Code Section 42-1102 makes clear that the 
statute provides a right of private eminent domain for irrigation purposes beyond those factual 
scenarios involving only riparian parcels abutting natural streams. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 
provides, in pertinent part: 
When any such owners or claimants to land have not sufficient 
length of frontage on a stream to afford the requisite fall for a 
ditch ... on their own premises for the proper irrigation thereof, 
or where the land proposed to he irrigated is hack from the hanks 
of such stream, and convenient facilities otherwise for the 
watering of said lands cannot be had, such owners or claimants are 
entitled to a right-of-way through the lands of others, for the 
purposes of irrigation. 
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See, IDAHO CODE § 42-1102 (emphasis added). Thus, Idaho Code Section 42-1102 applies to at 
least two different scenarios as illustrated by the statute's use of the disjunctive tenn "or." The 
statute applies when (I) riparian property owners lack sufficient stream frontage, and (2) when 
the land proposed to be irrigated is back from the banks of such stream. While the Brattons' 
readily concede that the first scenario is not present in this case (as they are not riparian land 
owners with frontage on a natural stream), they do clearly irrigate lands that are set back from· 
the nearest natural stream (the Boise River in this instance), and consequently require the 
necessary irrigation easement and right-of-way across the Defendants' property to access that 
Boise River water that is delivered to them through the nearby Canyon Hill Lateral or Canal. 
Despite Defendants' assertions otherwise, the Brattons' interpretation of Idaho 
Code Section 42-1102, and its application to the factual scenario presented in their Complaint, 
does comport with Idaho Supreme Court authority that interprets the statute in the very same 
manner. See, e.g., Canyon Viewlrr. Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 607 (1980) 
("In order to assist owners of water rights whose lands are remote from the water source, the 
state has partially delgated its powers of eminent domam to private individuals ... 
[I.C. §§ 42-1102 and - 1106] pennit landlocked individuals to condemn a right-of-way through 
the lands of others for purposes of irrigation. "). In the case at bar, the Brattons are the very 
"landlocked" individuals that, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, are expressly assisted by 
the irrigation easement and right-of way provided by Idaho Code Section 42-1lO2. The Canyon 
View Irr. Co. court in no way restricts the application of the statute to only those situations 
involving riparian landowners without sufficient stream frontage to construct a suitable ditch, nor 
would it given that Idaho common law abolished the riparian rights doctrine (with respect to 
irrigation rights) nearly a century ago. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 
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Idaho 484,491 (1909). Instead, Idaho Code Section 42-1102 applies both to: (1) such 
unfortunately situated riparian landowners, as well as to (2) "landlocked" individuals ''whose 
lands are remote from the water source." Canyon View frr. Co., 101 Idaho at 607. 
Consequently, Idaho Code Section 42-1102 squarely applies to the consideration of the irrigation 
easement and right-of-way at issue in this matter. 
B. Nampa & Meridian frr. Dist v. Washington Federal Sav, , 135 Idaho 518 
(2001) Is Not Dispositive Regarding the Application of Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102 
The Defendants argue, in part, that Nampa & Meridian frr. Dist. v. Washington 
Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518 (2001) is dispositive in this matter because it involved the 
interpretation and the application of an express written easement and its juxtaposition and 
competition with the provisions of Idaho Code Section 42-1102. In exceedingly short shrift, and 
as the Defendants point out, in Nampa & Meridian frr. Dist., the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
the express written easement was not trumped by the application ofIdaho Code Section 42-1102. 
This does not mean, however, that the converse was true, and that that the express easement 
agreement trumped application of the statute. The Idaho Supreme Court's decision was not 
predicated upon a general finding that the written express easement trumped the application of 
Idaho Code Section 42-1102, rather the Supreme Court declined to apply the statute in the overly 
expansive manner in which the Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District argued. 
In Nampa & Meridian frr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518 
(2001), Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District attempted to prohibit Washington Federal Bank's 
construction of a fence and a sidewalk within the easement and right of way for the Finch 
Lateral. fd. at 521. Rather than holding that the Channel Change Easement agreement trumped 
the application of Idaho Code Section 42-1102 for purposes of defining the scope of the Finch 
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Lateral easement, the Idaho Supreme Court instead held that neither the provisions of the express 
easement agreement nor the language of 42-1102 created a greater right in the irrigation district 
to the exclusion of the other. !d. at 522. In other words, the irrigation district had its well settled 
easement and right-of-way rights as confinned by Idaho Code Section 42-1102, but the servient 
landowner (Washington Federal) also had its underlying rights to use its property in any manner 
that did not interfere with the purposes and scope of the dominant irrigation easement. Id. In 
short, the irrigation district attempted to use Idaho Code Section 42-1102 in an impennissibly 
expansive manner, a manner that would have required the Court to find that the district's 
irrigation easement and right-of-way was exclusive, and that the statute also operated to bar 
Washington Federal's fence and sidewalk for public safety reasons. Understandably, the Court 
was not willing to reach that result because the express tenns of Idaho Code Section 42-1102 
does not give rise to an "exclusive" irrigation easement or right-of-way, nor does it contemplate 
the prohibition of encroachments for public safety reasons. Id. at 523-24. 
In the case at bar, the Brattons are seeking nothing more than the irrigation 
easement and right-of-way that Idaho Code Section 42-1 102 provides. The Brattons are not 
claiming that their irrigation easement and right-of-way is exclusive, and they are not trying to 
expand the purposes for which the easement exists. Instead, the Brattons are merely seeking the 
necessary irrigation easement and right-of-way that allows them to operate and maintain the 
ditch in the same reasonable and customary manner that they have done for over the last 33 
years, namely with a tractor and a V-ditcher-equipment commonly used and reasonably 
adapted for those operation and maintenance purposes. The Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dis!. court 
confirmed Nampa and Meridian Irrigation District's rights under Idaho Code 42-1102. It did not 
abrogate them in favor of the strict application of the express Channel Change Easement 
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Agreement. However, the Court was unwilling to expand the irrigation district's rights provided 
under the statute as the irrigation district desired. The bottom line for consideration in this 
matter is that the Bratton's irrigation easement and right-of-way preexisted the Defendants' 
ownership of their property. The Defendants took ownership of their property subject to that 
preexisting irrigation easement and right-of-way. While the Defendants are free to use their 
property in any manner that does not interfere with the purposes and scope for which the 
Brattons' irrigation easement and right-of-way was created, the Defendants absolutely may not 
obliterate the ditch and the easement altogether. The express easement agreement on record in 
this matter gives the Defendants no more rights than Idaho Code Section 42-1102 affords the 
Brattons. 
The Brattons have only those rights expressly afforded to them under Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102, and those are the only rights they seek. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 grants 
them a reasonable width ofland for their operation and maintenance oftheir ditch. The 
Defendants are not permitted to interfere with the ditch or the underlying irrigation easement and 
right-of-way without first receiving the express, written permission of the Brattons (the ditch 
owners). See IDAHO CODE § 42-1207. The Brattons are not seeking to increase any burden upon 
the servient estate in this matter. They are simply seeking to restore the irrigation easement and 
right-of way rights expressly granted to them by operation of Idaho Code Section 42-1102. The 
Defendants' property has been "burdened" by the use of a 12 foot irrigation easement and right-
of-way for over the past 33 years. That "burden" was accepted and acknowledged by the 
Defendants' predecessors-in-interest, including the unified parcel owner (Ford) who built the 
ditch in the first place. The Brattons are still seeking the same 12 foot easement. They are 
seeking to maintain the status quo, a status quo that the Defendants had no right to obliterate no 
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matter what the express easement on file provided. See IDAHO CODE § 42-1102; Nampa & 
Meridian frr. Dist. v. Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518 (2001); and Amended Complaint 
And Demand for Jury Trial at Ex. C (wherein the Gift Deed that conveyed the subject property to 
the Defendants expressly provided that the Defendants were taking ownership of the property 
"subject to any encumbrances or easements as appear of record or by use upon such property." 
(emphasis added». 
C. Omitting Idaho Code Section 42-1102 From Consideration in This Matter is 
Prejudicial 
While the Court is correct that some of the concepts encompassed within Idaho 
Code Section 42-1102 are also found within Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 andlor 42-1207, not 
all of the concepts set forth within Idaho Code Section 42-1102 that are germane to the 
consideration of this matter are so incorporated. Consequently, barring the application ofIdaho 
Code Section 42-1102 to the consideration of this matter will prejudice the Bratton's case. 
For example, Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 and 42-1207 speak only in terms of 
the existing irrigation easement or right-of way, and the protection of that easement and right-of-
way and the corresponding facility which the underlying easement and right-ofway serves. 
Those statutes do not speak in terms of the initial creation and necessity of the irrigation 
easement and right-of-way in the first place. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 not only contemplates 
the operation and maintenance needs for a facility's corresponding irrigation easement and right-
of-way, but also sets out the reasons for which the easement and right-of-way are created to 
begin with. The requisite irrigation easement and right-of way is created in order to assist those 
landowners in conveying their water rights to their landlocked properties. This is a factual 
element which is central to the consideration of this case. If the Brattons cannot satisfY the 
requisite needs for the irrigation easement and right-ofway under 42-1102, then there is no 
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reason to consider the further protections that Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 and 42-1207 
provide. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 informs why the Brattons need an irrigation easement and 
right-of-way in the first place, and further informs what rights they possess in relation to servient 
landowners for the operation and maintenance of the ditch they possess. 
Additionally, another key component to this case, and a concept that is only 
provided for in Idaho Code Section 42-1102, is the "notice concept"-the fact that the mere 
existence of an open ditch on the surface of the ground puts the Defendants on notice that the 
ditch possesses a corresponding irrigation easement and right-of-way across the Defendants' 
property. The visibility of the surface ditch puts the Defendants on notice that others have the 
right to operate and maintain the surface ditch on the Defendants' property, that others have the 
requisite rights for ingress and egress from the property, and that others have the right to use a 
reasonable width of the property for irrigation conveyance purposes. Moreover, Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102 puts the Defendants on notice that they are not pennitted to interfere with the 
use and enjoyment of that dominant irrigation easement and right-of-way. In this matter, given 
the existence of the open and notorious surface ditch, the Defendants were fully aware that their 
actions in obliterating the existing ditch, and attempting to relocate it elsewhere on their 
property, interfered with the longstanding rights of others, and that they knowingly perfonned 
their tortious acts. with a total disregard for the open and obvious rights of others. 
HI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court reconsider its 
prior ruling that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 does not apply to the consideration of the case at 
bar. The express language of the statute, and the statutory interpretation of the Idaho Supreme 
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otherwise. 
DATED this ~ day of September, 2008. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE I. 
BRATTON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821 C 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE 
SEPTEMBER 4, 2008 RULING OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
COMES NOW plaintiffs Charles E. Bratton and Mrujorie I. Bratton (collectively 
"Brattons"), pursuant to IRCP 7(b)(1), IRCP 11(a)(2)(B) and Idaho Appellate Rule 12(b), moves 
this Court for its order reconsidering its order of September 4, 2008 or alternatively to grant 
permission to appeal from the Court's ruling on September 4,2008, finding that Idaho Code 
Section 42-1102 does not apply to the consideration of the case at bar. This motion is based 
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upon the Motion for Reconsideration, pleadings, other matters filed herein, and the memorandum 
submitted herewith. 
DATED this 6i1- day of September, 2008. 
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FIELDS, CHARTERED 
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PERKINS, COIE, L.L.P. 
251 E. Front St., Suite 400 
P.O. Box 737 
Boise, ID 83701-0737 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE 1. 
BRATTON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE 
SEPTEMBER 4, 2008 RULING OR 
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
Plaintiffs are concerned about the Courts finding that Idaho Code Section 42-1102 
does not apply to the consideration of the case at bar. Rather, the Brattons contend that failing to 
apply Idaho Code Section 42-1102 in this matter will prejudice their case because, while it is true 
that Idaho Code Sections 42-1204 and 42-1207 do encompass some of the concepts discussed by 
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Idaho Code Section 42-1102, the Chapter 12 statutes do not incorporate all of the Chapter 11 
concepts that are gennane to the Court's and the jury's consideration ofthis matter. 
"Under LA.R. 12, a party may seek pennission to appeal from an interlocutory 
order which is not otherwise appealable as a matter of right under LA.R. 11(d)." Kindred v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 149, 795 P.2d 309,311 (1990). The "criteria for 
pennission to appeal" are whether the order "involves a controlling question oflaw as to which 
there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the 
order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution ofthe litigation." I.A.R. 12(a). 
"Generally, an appeal under I.A.R. 12 will be pennitted when the order involves a controlling 
question oflaw as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and that an 
immediate appeal may materially advance the orderly resolution ofthe litigation. Kindred v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho at 149, 795 P.2d at 311. See also Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 
2,4,665 P.2d 701, 703 (1983). In this matter, all those considerations are fulfilled. 
As is more fully set forth in the Motion for Reconsideration, in this case, great 
prejudice will result if the Court does not reconsider its September 4 order, or grant an 
immediate appeal of the order. The irrigation statutes are controlling issues oflaw in this case. 
No adequate remedy at law exists in this matter as plaintiffs have been foreclosed the 
opportunity to present complete factual and legal details to the jury regarding the irrigation 
easement. Further, the jury instructions are deficient by failing to pennit the inclusion of Idaho 
Code Section 42-1102. Plaintiffs have been deprived of an opportunity to present evidence on 
the irrigation easement and pennanent and irreparable harm will result in plaintiffs' case. An 
immediate appeal would advance orderly resolution of the litigation, and an immediate appeal 
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would enable the parties to avoid the burden of unnecessary trial preparations and trial if the 
Brattons prevail. 
For the reasons stated above and more specifically supported in the Motion for 
Reconsideration, plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court issue its order granting an 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12. 
DATED this stL- day of September, 2008. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
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Shelly H. Cozakos 
PERKINS, Co IE, L.L.P. 
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P.O. Box 737 
Boise, ID 83701-0737 
Facsimile (208) 343-3232 
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( ..yHand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
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M ADAMSON. OEPUTY 
INSTRUCTION NO.1 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence in 
question which provided that if a landowner changes a ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried 
irrigation conduit: 
Such change must be made in such a manner as not to impede the 
flow of the water therein, or to otherwise injure any person or 
persons using or interested in such ditch, canal, lateral or drain or 
buried irrigation conduit. Any increased operation and 
maintenance shall be the responsibility of the landowner who 
makes the change. 
A violation of the statute is negligence per se. 
Idaho Code § 42·1207 
Allen v. Burggraf Construction Co., 
106 Idaho 451 (Ct. App. 1984) 
Simonson v. Moon, 
72 Idaho 39 (1951). 
IDJI2d 2.22 (modified) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE 1. 
BRATTON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
PLAINTIFFS' THIRD 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
COME NOW plaintiffs Charles E. Bratton and Marjorie 1. Bratton (collectively 
"Brattons"), by and through undersigned counsel of record, submit the attached Supplemental 
Proposed Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of September, 2008, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Shelly H. Cozakos 
PERKINS, CorE, L.L.P. 
251 E. Front St., Suite 400 
P.O. Box 737 
Boise,ID 83701-0737 
Facsimile (208) 343-3232 
PLAINTIFFS' THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS- 3 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
~ Nancy J. Garrett 
000375 
Client:997199.1 
INSTRUCTION NO. __ 
A ditch easement is a property right separate and apart from the water right 
associated with the ditch. The water right is also an independent property right. 
Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Assoc. v. 





You have found that the Brattons hold an express easement of three-feet. 
Associated with that primary easement is a "secondary easement" used for the express purpose 
of repairing and maintaining the primary easement. The secondary easement pennits the 
Brattons to reasonably and necessarily expand the primary easement for the sole purpose of 
repair and maintenance. 
Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 
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--_ ..A.M. P.M. 
Nancy J. Garrett, ISB No. 4026 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
njg@moffatt.com 
23655.0000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE I. 
BRATTON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Charles E. Bratton and Matjorie I. Bratton (collectively 
"Bratton"), by and through undersigned counsel of record, and hereby files this motion seeking 
reconsideration of the Court's September 10, 2008 ruling from the bench that newly discovered 
evidence of Mr. Scotts invasion of the Brattons' property and privacy rights was inadmissible. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION .. 1 Cllent:998700.1 
000378 
!4J003/010 
On September 10, 2008, Mr. Bratton was sworn and testified regarding his 
interactions with Mr. Scott. On direct exam, Mr. Bratton's counsel questioned him about an 
incident that occurred the previous night following trial. As Mr. Bratton began to recount his 
experience from the night before, defendants objected and the Court sustained said objection and 
further admonished plaintiffs' counsel that such testimony was outside the permissible scope of 
the rules. In admonishing plaintiffs' counsel, the Court further stated that such alleged 
misconduct might serve as grounds for a mistrial and the assessment of costs and fees. 
However, with all due respect, the evidence of the previous nights interactions are 
precisely the type of conduct that Mr. Bratton alleged in the Amended Complaint filed with the 
Court on January 16,2008. More specifically, Count V and VI deal with the tortious conduct of 
Mr. Scott and his interference with the Brattons' property and privacy rights. Moreover, the acts 
observed by Mr. Bratton of Mr. Scott jumping on the fence between the Scotts' property and that 
of the Brattons and attempting to videotape the Brattons is objective evidence supporting the 
contentions initially raised in the Brattons' complaint. This evidence was not a "surprise" as 
Characterized by the Court, as Scotts' counsel admitted that she requested Mr. Scott to videotape 
the easement. Counsel was aware that Mr. Scott would be on or near the easement. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Scott was unable to control himself and again harassed and invaded Mr. 
Bratton's privacy and property. Such evidence is relevant to the allegations raised in the 
Brattons' complaint and is therefore admissible. 
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that testimony of prior acts that 
are in conformity with those alleged can be admissible evidence, especially where credibility is 
at issue. In State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d 1304 (1992), the Court recognized that 
"the jury was better able to compare patterns and methods, details and generalities, consistencies 
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and discrepancies, and thereby made a more meaningful and accurate assessment of the parties' 
credibility." Id. at 905,828 P.2d at 1310. 
In this case, allegations of whether Mr. Scott has invaded the Brattons' property 
and privacy rights involve a credibility assessment by the jury. That is, the jury must decide 
whether they believe Mr. Scott's version of his actions or the Brattons. Additional testimony of 
Mr. Bratton regarding Mr. Scott's continued conduct only serves to confirm the allegations that 
Mr. Scott has and continues to act unreasonably and in violation of the Brattons' privacy and 
property rights. 
Given the claims lodged against Mr. Scott, this evidence is relevant, and 
pennissible. Furthermore, it serves as further confinnation of Mr. Brattons testimony of Mr. 
Scott's conduct and that such conduct continues. Accordingly, plaintiffs respectfully request the 
Court to reconsider and permit testimony regarding Mr. Scotts conduct on the evening of 
September 9, 2008 as relevant and admissible evidence. 
YL 
DATED this -LL day of September, 2008. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION· 3 Cllent:998700.1 
000380 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this L"day of September, 2008, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION to be served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Shelly H. Cozakos 
PERKINS, COlE, L.L.P. 
251 E. Front St.. Suite 400 
P.O. Box 737 
Boise. ID 83701·0737 
Facsimile (208) 343-3232 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION- 4 
000381. 
( ~J{S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( '111and Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) FacsimiJe 
Client:998700.1 
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Nancy J. Garrett, ISB No. 4026 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
njg@moffatt.com 
23655.0000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE 1. 
BRA TrON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL BRIEF 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Charles E. Bratton and Marjorie I. Bratton (collectively 
"Bratton"), by and through undersigned counsel of record, and hereby files this supplemental 
trial brief setting forth the additional legal authority regarding establishing proximate cause. 
Proximate cause "focuses upon legal policy in terms of whether responsibility 
will be extended to the consequences of conduct which has occurred." Newberry v. Martens, 
SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL BRIEF - 1 Client:99869 7.1 
000382 
09/11/2008 . MOFFATT THOlIAS 141 007/010 
142 Idaho 284, 288,127 P.3d 187,191 (2005) (quoting Munsan v. State, Dept. a/Highways, 96 
Idaho 529, 531, 531 P.2d 1174, 1176 (l975)). Phrased differently, it is the defendant's conduct 
(actual cause) that inflicts the hann, but it is the law (legal cause or true proximate cause) that 
detennines whether liability for that conduct attaches. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court made clear in Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical 
Center, 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001), that expert testimony regarding causation in a medical 
malpractice case was not required. In Sheridan, a newborn who went untreated for jaundice, and 
his hyperbiJirubinaemia eventually led to cerebral palsy. In that case, there was a direct chain 
fonned, linking the nurses' negligence, the child's untreated jaundice (which was untreated for 
various reasons) and his development of cerebral palsy. Specifically, the nurses did not notify 
the child's pediatrician during the first 24 hours of life that the child was jaundiced, nor that 
bilirubin tests had not been conducted; did not chart indicia that could have been used to trace 
the jaundice's progress, and did not note the possible blood incompatibility between mother and 
child. Moreover, nursing staff failed to warn the child's parents, upon discharge, that the 
jaundice he had might not be normal. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in determining whether an expert was required to 
testify regarding proximate cause held "proximate cause can be shown from a 'chain of 
circumstances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally 
inferable. '" Id. at 785, 25 P.3d at 98. The Court further bolstered this point through discussion 
of Formant v. Kircher, 91 Idaho 290, 420 P.2d 661 (1966). In Farmont, the plaintiff suffered a 
compound fracture in his leg which ultimately led to amputation due to an untreatable infection. 
The trial court found that the defendant had been negligent but stated that the pJaintiffhad failed 
to prove proximate cause. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found that ample evidence 
SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL BRIEF w 2 Client:998697.1 
000383 
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existed to demonstrate that the defendant had been negligent. ld. at 297, 420 P.2d at 668. The 
Court further held that proximate cause was established because the plaintiff lost his leg and 
there were no intervening causes. ld. In reversing the trial court, the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated the rule: 
Respondent was not required to prove his case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, nor by direct and positive evidence. It was only necessary 
that he show a chain of circumstances from which the ultimate fact 
required to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable. 
Helland v. Bridenstine, 55 Wash. 470, 104 P. 626. As is said in 
Dimock v. Miller, 202 Cal. 668, 262 P. 311 : 
"If the rule of law is as contended for by defendant and appellant, 
and it is necessary to demonstrate conclusively and beyond the 
possibility of doubt that the negligence resulted in the injury, it 
would never be possible to recover in a case of negligence in the 
practice of a profession which is not an exact science." (Citations 
omitted). 
Id. at 296,420 P.2d at 667. 
In this case, plaintiffs have testified that their medical conditions were caused by 
the harassment and invasion of privacy by Mr. Scott. Mr. and Mrs. Bratton can testify to how 
they felt, that the medical conditions they are suffering were not present prior to the incidents 
with Mr. Scott. Further, the Brattons have testified that the medical conditions were not caused 
by any intervening factor, such as in Formont. The Brattons are not required to present expert 
testimony regarding medical conditions that are not beyond the ken of a layperson. In this case, 
I4l 008/010 
the Brattons have presented direct testimony of their conditions and the '''chain of circumstances 
from which the ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable. ", 
Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 785, 25 P.3d at 98. 
Based upon clear Idaho law, the Brattons are not required to prove proximate 
cause through an expert. The Brattons must only present evidence that establishes a reasonable 
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and naturally inferable cause, which they have done. As such, the jury should detennine whether 
the medical conditions suffered by the Brattons were proximately cause by Mr. Scott. 
-'-
DATED this ~ day of September, 2008. 
SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL BRIEF - 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /r<-"day of September, 2008, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL BRIEF to be served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Shelly H. Cozakos 
PERKINS, COlE, L.L.P. 
251 E. Front St., Suite 400 
P.O. Box 737 
Boise, ill 83701-0737 
Facsimile (208) 343·3232 
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(-qRand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
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CASE NO. CV-2007-6821-C 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
-------------------------~) 
We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special 
verdict as follows: 
Question No.1: Did the Scotts negligently interfere with the 
Brattons' easement? 
Answer to Question No.1: 
Yes-X- No ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.1, proceed to answer Question No.2. 
If you answered No to Question No.1, skip Questions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and 




Question No.2: Was the Scotts' negligence a proximate cause of 
harm to the Brattons? 
Answer to Question No.2: 
YesL No ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.2, proceed to answer Question No.3. 
If you answered No, proceed to Question No.7. 
Question No.3: Did the Scotts change the irrigation ditch? 
Answer to Question No.3: 
YesL No ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.3, proceed to answer Question No.4. 
If you answered No to Question No.3, skip Questions 4 and 5 and proceed 
to Question No.6. 
Question No.4: Did the Scotts have written permission to change 
the irrigation ditch? 
Answer to Question No.4: 
Yes -- No X 
If you answered Question No.4, proceed to answer Question No.5. 
Question No.5: Did changing the irrigation ditch result in a 




Answer to Question No.5: 
Yes No X --
Proceed to answer Question No.6. 
Question No.6: Did the Scotts interfere with the Brattons' 
easement by threat of harm? 
Answer to Question No.6: 
Yes -- No X } 
Please proceed to answer Question No.7. 
Question No.7: Did the Scotts interfere with the Brattons' right to 
privacy? 
Answer to Question No.7 
Yes -- No X 
If you answered Yes to Question No.7, please proceed to answer Question 
No.8. If you answered No to Question No.7, please do not answer 
Question No.8 and sign and date this Special Verdict Form. 
Question No.8: Was the Scotts' interference with the Brattons' 
right to privacy a proximate cause of harm to the Brattons? 
Answer to Question No.8 
Yes -- No ---
3 
000389 
• < • 
As soon as nine or more of you have agreed on the answers to the 
questions, sign and date this Verdict Form and notify the Bailiff. If your 
answer is unanimous, your foreman alone shall sign and date this Verdict 
Form; but if nine or more but less than the entire jury agree, then those so 
agreeing shall sign this Verdict Form. Please sign your name and list your 
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CASE NO. CV-2007-6821-C 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
000392 
, l 
INSTRUCTION NO. --..;..J _ 
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Weare now taking 
up Bratton v Scott, Canyon County case number CV-2007-6821. I am Judge 
Hoff. You have been summoned as prospective jurors in the lawsuit now 
before us. The first thing we do in a trial is to select 12 jurors and two 
alternate jurors from among you. 
I now want to introduce you to the court personnel who will be 
assisting me throughout the trial. Seated on my right is my deputy clerk, 
Sue Maund. The deputy clerk of court marks the trial exhibits and 
administers oaths to you jurors and the witnesses. Next, I want to introduce 
the bailiff, Ken Fisher. The bailiff will assist me in maintaining courtroom 
order and will arrange for your meals after this case has been submitted to 
you for decision. Seated directly in front of me is my court reporter, Carol 
Bull. The court reporter will keep a verbatim account of all matters of 
record during the trial. Carol is a certified short hand reporter, and with the 
machine she is using she will take down every word that is said during this 
trial. Next, I want to introduce Jennifer Brown. Jennifer is a lawyer who 
will also be assisting me in this trial. 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the "plaintiff." In this suit the 
plaintiffs are Charles and Marjorie Bratton. The plaintiffs are represented by 
000393 
their lawyers Nancy Jo Garrett and Richard C. Fields of the law finn 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields. The party against whom a 
lawsuit is brought is called the "defendant." The defendants in this suit are 
John and Jackie Scott. The defendants are represented by their lawyers 
Shelly Cozakos and Cynthia Y ee-Wallace of the law finn Perkins Coie. 
This is a civil case involving an easement dispute. An easement is the 
right to use the land of another for a specific purpose. Since 1973, the 
Brattons have owned 4.83 acres of pasture land in Canyon County. When 
the Brattons purchased their property in 1973, the prior owner deeded a 3 
foot wide, written irrigation ditch easement across his property to the 
Brattons. The Scotts now own the property where the easement is located. 
The Brattons' pasture land is located next to the Scotts' residence and 
property. This easement allows the Brattons to access, use, and maintain a 
ditch located on the Scotts' property for irrigation purposes. 
The following are the general allegations and defenses in this case. 
The Brattons allege that they have a 12 foot wide easement. The Brattons 
further allege that in 2007, the Scotts interfered with their easement rights, 
by destroying a ditch and interfering with their right of privacy in connection 
with the easement. The Scotts deny the easement is more than 3 feet wide 
and allege that they have continually allowed Plaintiffs to access and 
000394 
maintain the easement. The Scotts further deny that they have destroyed the 
ditch and further allege the Brattons have suffered no harm as a result of any 
actions by the Scotts. 
A trial starts with the selection of a fair, impartial jury. To that end the 
court and the lawyers will ask each of you questions to discover whether you 
have any information concerning the case or any opinions or attitudes which 
either of the lawyers believes might cause you to favor or disfavor some part 
of the evidence or one side or the other. The questions may probe deeply 
into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences, but they are not intended to 
embarrass you. If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say 
so. If you do understand the question, you should answer it freely. The 
clerk of the court will now swear you for the jury examination. 
000395 
INSTRUCTION NO. J 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my 
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you 
must follow my instructions regardless of your own opinion of what the law is 
or should be, or what either side may state the law to be. You must consider 
them as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in 
which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the 
evidence before you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in 
your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital to the 
administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted 
in this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the 
exhibits offered and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The 
production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At times during 
the trial, an objection may be made to a question asked a witness, or to a 
witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked to 
decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are 
designed to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your 
deliberations. If I sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the 
000396 
witness may not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do 
not attempt to guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit 
might have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a particular 
statement or exhibit you should put it out of your mind, and not refer to it or 
rely on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law 
which should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At 
other times I will excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be 
comfortable while we work out any problems. You are not to speculate about 
any such discussions. They are necessary from time to time and help the trial 
run more smoothly. 
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," 
"direct evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these 
terms. You are to consider all the evidence admitted in this trial. 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As 
the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and 
what weight you attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. 
You bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of 
your lives. In your everyday affairs you determine for yourselves whom you 
000397 
believe, what you believe, and how much weight you attach to what you are 
told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in 
making these decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your 
deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply 
because more witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role 
is to think about the testimony of each witness you heard and decide how 
much you believe of what the witness had to say. 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an 
opinion on that matter. In detennining the weight to be given such opinion, 
you should consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the 
reasons given for the opinion. You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the 
weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
000398 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the 
attorneys or their employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2 You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to 
discuss the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, 
or to influence your decision in the case, you must report it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire 
to the jury room to deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of 
the testimony and have received my instructions as to the law that applies to 
the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a 
greater understanding of the case. 
6. Do not make any investigation of this case or inquiry outside of 
the courtroom on your own. Do not go any place mentioned in the testimony 
without an explicit order from me to do so. You must not consult any books, 
dictionaries, encyclopedias, the internet or any other source of information 
unless I specifically authorize you to do so. 
000399 
7. Do not read about the case in the newspapers. Do not listen to 
radio or television broadcasts about the trial. You must base your verdict 
solely on what is presented in court and not upon any newspaper, radio, 
television or other account of what may have happened. 
000400 
INSTRUCTION NO. _Lf--=--_ 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my 
instructions concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that 
have been admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in the course 
of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not 
thereby diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your 
notes to yourself and not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury 
deliberations at the end of the trial. 
000401. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _5 __ 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in 
this case. I have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint 
you with the issues decided. 
000402 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Any party who asserts that certain facts existed or exist has the burden 
of proving those facts. When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a 
proposition, or use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean 
you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true than not 
true. 
000403 
INSTRUCTION NO. '7 
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific 
purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the 
owner. 
000404 
INSTRUCTION NO. _g=--_ 
Plaintiffs claim that they have an implied easement over Defendants' 
property based upon prior use. In order to establish an implied easement by 
prior use, Plaintiffs must prove the following three elements: 
(1) Unity of title or ownership and subsequent separation by 
grant of the dominant estate; 
(2) Apparent continuous use long enough before conveyance of 
the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be 
permanent; and 
(3) That the easement is reasonably necessary to the proper 
enjoyment of the dominant estate. 
000405 
G 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
The land that benefits from the easement is the dominant estate. The 
land which is burdened by the easement is the servient estate. The Brattons 




The owners or constructors of ditches, canals, works or other 
aqueducts, and their successors in interest, using and employing the same to 
convey the waters of any stream or spring, whether the said ditches, canals, 
works or aqueducts be upon the lands owned or claimed by them, or upon 
other lands, must carefully keep and maintain the same, and the 
embankments, flumes or other conduits, by which such waters are or may be 
conducted, in good repair and condition, so as not to damage or in any way 
injure the property or premises of others. The owners or constructors have 
the right to enter the land across which the right-of-way extends, for the 
purposes of cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit, 
and to occupy such width of the land along the banks of the ditch, canal or 
conduit as is necessary to properly do the work of cleaning, maintaining and 
repairing the ditch, canal or conduit with personnel and with such equipment 
as is commonly used, or is reasonably adapted, to that work. The right-of-
way also includes the right to deposit on the banks of the ditch or canal the 
debris and other matter necessarily required to be taken from the ditch or 
canal to properly clean and maintain it, but no greater width of land along 
the banks of the canal or ditch than is absolutely necessary for such deposits 
shall be occupied by the removed debris or other matter. 
000407 
INSTRUCTION No.lL 
The right of an easement holder may not be enlarged and may not 
encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the easement. 
000408 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and 
have told you of some of the matters which you may consider in weighing 
the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present 
their closing remarks to you; and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their 
deliberations are important. It is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, 
to make an emphatic expression of his or her opinion on the case or to state 
how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, his or 
her sense of pride may be aroused; and he or she may hesitate to change his 
or her position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not 
partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views; and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
disturbing your individual jUdgment. Each of you must decide this case for 
yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of 
the case with your fellow jurors. 
000409 
INSTRUCTION NO. R 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, 
who will preside over your deliberations. 
A verdict form will be submitted to you with necessary instructions. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. 
As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon verdict, you should 
fill out the verdict form and have it signed. If your decision is unanimous, 
your foreman alone will sign the verdict; but if nine or more but less than the 
entire jury agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict form, you will 
notify the bailiff, who will then return you into open court. 
0004:10 
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INSTRUCTION NO . .ri 
During your deliberation, you are never to reveal to anyone how the 
jury stands on any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, 
unless requested to do so by me. 
00041.1. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. Q 
In this case, you will be given a verdict fonn with a question. The 
verdict fonn consists of a question that you are to answer. I will read the 
verdict fonn to you now. 
We, the Jury, answer the following question: 
Question No.1: Have the Plaintiffs met their burden of proof by 
establishing that they have a 12 foot wide implied easement? 
Answer to Question No.1: 
Yes No -- ---
As soon as nine or more of you have agreed on the answer, sign and 
date this Verdict F onn and notify the Bailiff. If your answer is unanimous, 
your foreman alone shall sign and date this Verdict Fonn; but if nine or 




INSTRUCTION NO. I ~ 
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. We are now taking 
up Day 3 of Bratton v Scott, Canyon County case number CV-2007-6821. 
Yesterday you jurors returned a verdict finding the Brattons do not have an 
implied easement of 12 feet. I will now acquaint you with the 2nd phase of 
the trial. As previously advised, the Brattons have a 3 foot irrigation 
easement across the Scotts' property. This easement allows the Brattons to 
access, use, and maintain a ditch located on the Scotts' property for 
irrigation purposes. 
The following are the general allegations and defenses in this case. 
The Brattons allege that in 2007, the Scotts interfered with their easement 
rights, by destroying and moving the ditch and interfering with their right of 
privacy in connection with the easement. The Scotts allege that they have 
continually allowed Plaintiffs to access and maintain the easement. The 
Scotts deny that they have destroyed or moved the ditch or interfered with 
the Brattons' privacy. The Scotts further allege that the Brattons have 
suffered no harm as a result of any actions by the Scotts. 
At this time we will proceed with opening statements of counsel. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _' 11 
Any party who asserts that certain facts existed or exist has the burden 
of proving those facts. When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a 
proposition, or use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean 




It was the duty of all parties, before and at the time of the occurrence, 
to use ordinary care for the safety of themselves and each other, and for their 
own and each other's property. 
00041.5 
INSTRUCTION NO. ft 
The plaintiffs have the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions: 
1. The defendants were negligent. 
2. The plaintiffs were injured. 
3. The negligence of the defendants was a proximate cause of the 
injury to the plaintiffs. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Were the defendants negligent, and if so, was the negligence a proximate 
cause of the injuries to the plaintiffs? 
00041.6 
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INSTRUCTION NO. m 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the 
failure to use ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. 
The words "ordinary care" mean the care a reasonably careful person would 
use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a 
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably 
careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by 
the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would 
act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide. 
00041.7 
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INSTRUCTION NO.:2 ( 
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in 
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage 
complained of. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a 




INSTRUCTION NO. cf e..!..-
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to 
minimize the damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results 
from a failure to exercise such care cannot be recovered. 
00041.9 
INSTRUCTION NO . . 2 3 
The owners or constructors of ditches, canals, works or other 
aqueducts, and their successors in interest, using and employing the same to 
convey the waters of any stream or spring, whether the said ditches, canals, 
works or aqueducts be upon the lands owned or claimed by them, or upon 
other lands, must carefully keep and maintain the same, and the 
embankments, flumes or other conduits, by which such waters are or may be 
conducted, in good repair and condition, so as not to damage or in any way 
injure the property or premises of others. The owners or constructors have 
the right to enter the land across which the right-of-way extends, for the 
purposes of cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit, 
and to occupy such width of the land along the banks of the ditch, canal or 
conduit as is necessary to properly do the work of cleaning, maintaining and 
repairing the ditch, canal or conduit with personnel and with such equipment 
as is commonly used, or is reasonably adapted, to that work. The right-of-
way also includes the right to deposit on the banks of the ditch or canal the 
debris and other matter necessarily required to be taken from the ditch or 
canal to properly clean and maintain it, but no greater width of land along 
the banks of the canal or ditch than is absolutely necessary for such deposits 
shall be occupied by the removed debris or other matter. 
000420 
INSTRUCTION NO -..2!i 
Idaho law provides, where any ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried 
irrigation conduit has heretofore been, or may hereafter be, constructed 
across or beneath the lands of another, the person or persons owning or 
controlling said land shall have the right at their own expense to change said 
ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation conduit to any other part of 
said land, but such change must be made in such a manner as not to impede 
the flow of the water therein, or to otherwise injure any person or persons 
using or interested in such ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation 
conduit. Any increased operation and maintenance shall be the responsibility 
of the landowner who makes the change. 
The written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or 
buried irrigation conduit must first be obtained before it is changed or 




A minor increase in the length of a ditch or other conditions which 
negligibly increase its maintenance are insufficient injuries by themselves to 





To prevail on a claim of invasion of privacy, the Brattons must prove 
each of the following propositions: 
1. The Defendants intentionally intruded, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of the Brattons or into their private concerns 
or affairs; and 
2. The intrusion was into a matter which the Brattons had a right 
to keep private; and 
3. The methods used by the defendants in the invasion would be 
objectionable to a reasonable person. 
Because the right of privacy is measured by the reasonable person 
standard, the right of privacy is relative to the customs of the time and 
place, and is determined by the norm of the ordinary person. Thus, in order 
to constitute an invasion of privacy, an act must be of such a nature as a 
reasonable person can see that it might and probably would cause mental 
distress and injury to anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intellect, 
situated in like circumstances as the plaintiffs. 
If you find from the consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these propositions has been proved, then your verdict on invasion of privacy 
should be for the Plaintiffs. But, if you fmd from your consideration of all 
000423 
the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then your 
verdict should be for the Defendants. 
000424 
INSTRUCTION NO ~ 
Certain evidence was presented to you by deposition. A deposition is 
testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing and 
video tape. That evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would 
give had the witness testified from the witness stand. 
You received this testimony in open court. Although there is a record 




INSTRUCTION NO. ;;.g 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel prevents a party from asserting a right, 
to the detriment of another party, which is inconsistent with a position 
previously taken. Quasi-estoppel applies to plaintiffs' claims if you find that 
(1) plaintiffs took a different position than their original 
position; and 
(2) either of the following: 
(a) the plaintiffs gained an advantage; or 
(b) caused a disadvantage to defendants; or 
(c) it would be unconscionable or unfair to permit the 
plaintiffs to maintain an inconsistent position from one 




INSTRUCTION NO. d I 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be 
necessary for you to reach a verdict. Whether some of the instructions apply 
will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard any 
instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not 
exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an instruction has been 
given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
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INSTRUCTION NO . ..3f) 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and 
have told you of some of the matters which you may consider in weighing 
the evidence to detennine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present 
their closing remarks to you; and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their 
deliberations are important. It is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, 
to make an emphatic expression of his or her opinion on the case or to state 
how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, his or 
her sense of pride may be aroused; and he or she may hesitate to change his 
or her position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not 
partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views; and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for 
yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of 
the case with your fellow jurors. 
000428 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ~G$I 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, 
who will preside over your deliberations. 
A verdict form will be submitted to you with necessary instructions. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. 
As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon verdict, you should 
fill out the verdict form and have it signed. If your decision is unanimous, 
your foreman alone will sign the verdict; but if nine or more but less than the 
entire jury agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict form, you will 




During your deliberation, you are never to reveal to anyone how the 
jury stands on any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, 
unless requested to do so by me. 
000430 
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In this case, you will be given a special verdict form with questions. 
The verdict form consists of questions that you are to answer. I will read the 
special verdict form to you now. 
We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as 
follows: 
Question No.1: Did the Scotts negligently interfere with the 
Brattons' easement? 
Answer to Question No.1: 
Yes No -- ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.1, proceed to answer Question No.2. 
If you answered No to Question No.1, skip Questions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and 
proceed to Question No.7. 
Question No.2: Was the Scotts' negligence a proximate cause of 
harm to the Brattons? 
Answer to Question No.2: 
Yes No -- ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.2, proceed to answer Question No.3. 
If you answered No, proceed to Question No.7. 
000431. 
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Question No.3: Did the Scotts change the irrigation ditch? 
Answer to Question No.3: 
Yes No -- ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.3, proceed to answer Question No.4. 
If you answered No to Question No.3, skip Questions 4 and 5 and proceed 
to Question No.6. 
Question No.4: Did the Scotts have written permission to change 
the irrigation ditch? 
Answer to Question No.4: 
Yes No -- ---
If you answered Question No.4, proceed to answer Question No. 5 
Question No.5: Did changing the irrigation ditch result in a 
diminished flow of water to the Brattons' property? 
Answer to Question No.5: 
Yes No -- ---
Proceed to answer Question No.6. 
Question No.6: Did the Scotts interefere with the Brattons' 
easement by threat of harm? 
Answer to Question No.6: 
Yes No -- ---
000432 
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Please proceed to answer Question No.7. 
Question No.7: Did the Scotts interfere with the Brattons' right to 
privacy? 
Answer to Question No.7 
Yes No -- ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.7, please proceed to answer Question 
No.8. If you answered No to Question No.7, please do not answer 
Question No.8 and sign and date this Special Verdict Form. 
Question No.8: Was the Scotts' interference with the Brattons' 
right to privacy a proximate cause of harm to the Brattons? 
Answer to Question No.8 
Yes No -- ---
As soon as nine or more of you have agreed on the answers to the 
questions, sign and date this Verdict Form and notify the Bailiff. If your 
answer is unanimous, your foreman alone shall sign and date this Verdict 
Form; but if nine or more but less than the entire jury agree, then those so 




INSTRUCTION NO. ]~ 
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Weare now taking 
up Day 7 of Bratton v Scott, Canyon County case number CV -2007 -6821. 
Last week, you jurors concluded that there was no invasion of the Brattons' 
right to privacy. You further found that the Scotts did not interfere with the 
Brattons' easement by any threat of harm. You did find, through a special 
verdict, that the Scotts changed the irrigation ditch utilized by the Brattons. 
You further found that changing the ditch did not result in a diminished flow 
of irrigation water to the Brattons' property. You concluded, however, that 
no written permission was given to the Scotts by the Brattons to change the 
ditch. 
I will now acquaint you with the third phase of the trial. As 
previously advised, the Brattons have a 3 foot wide irrigation easement 
across the Scotts' property. This easement allows the Brattons to access, 
use, and maintain a ditch located on the Scotts' property for irrigation 
purposes. Phase 3 of the trial will consist of testimony and evidence on the 
issue of damages. By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I 
do not express any opinion as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 
damages. 
At this time we will proceed with opening statements of counsel. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 S 
Any party who asserts that certain facts existed or exist has the burden 
of proving those facts. When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a 
proposition, or use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean 




INSTRUCTION No.3 ~ 
To reacquaint you with the verdicts from the previous phases of this 
trial, I am attaching copies of the verdict forms. I have attached the Verdict 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CIUNON L :0 I 
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CHARLES E. BRATTON and 
MARJORIE I BRATTON 
(husband and wife), 
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CASE NO. CV-2007-6821-C 
-vs-
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE 
G. SCOTT (husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
We, the Jury, answer the following question: 
VERDICT FORM 
Question No.1: Have the Plaintiffs met their burden of proof by 
establishing that they have a 12 foot wide implied easement? 
Answer to Question No.1: 
Yes -- No-L 
As soon as nine or more of you have agreed on the answer, sign and 
date this Verdict Form and notify the Bailiff. If your answer is unanimous, 
your foreman alone shall sign and date this Verdict Form; but if nine or 
more but less than the entire jury agree, then those so agreeing shall sign this 
Verdict Form. 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and 
MARJORIE I BRATTON 
(husband and wife), 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKlE 















CASE NO. CV-2007-6821-C 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
We; the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special 
verdict as follows: 
Question No.1: Did the Scotts negligently interfere with the 
Brattons' easement? 
Answer to Question No.1: 
Yes A No ----
If you answered Yes to Question No.1, proceed to answer Question No.2. 
If you answered No to Question No.1, skip Questions 2, 3,4, 5, and 6 and 
proceed to Question No.7. 
1 
000439 
Question No.2: Was the Scotts' negligence a proximate cause of 
harm to the Brattons? 
Answer to Question No.2: 
Yes X No ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.2, proceed to answer Question No.3. 
If you answered No, proceed to Question No.7. 
Question No.3: Did the Scotts change the irrigation ditch? 
Answer to Question No.3: 
Yes X No ---
If you answered Yes to Question No.3, proceed to answer Question No.4. 
If you answered No to Question No.3, skip Questions 4 and 5 and proceed 
to Question No.6. 
Question No.4: Did the Scotts have written permission to change 
the irrigation ditch? 
Answer to Question No.4: 
Yes -- No X 
If you answered Question No.4, proceed to answer Question No.5. 
Question No.5: Did changing the irrigation ditch result in a 
diminished flow of water to the Brattons' property? 
2 
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Answer to Question No.5: 
Yes No X --
Proceed to answer Question No.6. 
Question No.6: Did the Scotts interfere with the Brattons' 
easement by threat of harm? 
Answer to Question No.6: 
Yes -- No X r 
Please proceed to answer Question No.7. 
Question No.7: Did the Scotts interfere with the Brattons' right to 
privacy? 
Answer to Question No.7 
Yes -- No X 
If you answered Yes to Question No.7, please proceed to answer Question 
No.8. If you answered No to Question No.7, please do not answer 
Question No.8 and sign and date this Special Verdict Form. 
Question No.8: Was the Scotts' interference with the Brattons' 
right to privacy a proximate cause of harm to the Brattons? 
Answer to Question No.8 




'. . . 
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As soon as nine or more of you have agreed on the answers to the 
questions, sign and date this Verdict Form and notify the Bailiff. If your 
answer is unanimous, your foreman alone shall sign and date this Verdict 
Form; but if nine or more but less than the entire jury agree, then those so 
agreeing shall sign this Verdict Form. Please sign your name and list your 







INSTRUCTION NO . .3 7 
If the jury determines the plaintiffs are entitled to recover 
damages from the defendants, then the jury must determine the amount 
of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiffs for 
any damages proved to be proximately caused by the defendants' 
negligence. 
The damages to plaintiffs' property are the reasonable cost of 
necessary repairs to restore the ditch to the condition it was in prior to 
the change by the defendants. 
000444 
INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and 
have told you of some of the matters which you may consider in weighing 
the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes counsel will present 
their closing remarks to yOU; and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their 
deliberations are important. It is rarely productive for a juror, at the outset, 
to make an emphatic expression of his or her opinion on the case or to state 
how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, his or 
her sense of pride may be aroused; and he or she may hesitate to change his 
or her position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not 
partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no 
triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views; and deliberate 
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this case for 
yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration of 
the case with your fellow jurors. 
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INSTRUCTION No.3 q 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, 
who will preside over your deliberations. 
A verdict fonn will be submitted to you with necessary instructions. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. 
As soon as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon verdict, you should 
fill out the verdict fonn and have it signed. If your decision is unanimous, 
your foreman alone will sign the verdict; but if nine or more but less than the 
entire jury agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict fonn, you will 
notify the bailiff, who will then return you into open court. 
000446 
INSTRUCTION NO. L( 0 
During your deliberation, you are never to reveal to anyone how the 
jury stands on any of the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, 
unless requested to do so by me. 
000447 
INSTRUCTION NO. _Y_' 
In this phase, you will be gIven a damages verdict form with a 
question. The verdict form consists of a question that you are to answer by 
filling in the blanks of both parts. I will read the damages verdict form to 
you now. 
We, the Jury, answer the following question: 
Question No.1: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the 
plaintiffs as a result of the change in the irrigation ditch that was made 
by the Scotts? 
Answer to Question No.1: We assess plaintiffs' damages as 
follows: 
1. Money damages, if any, for changing the irrigation ditch without 
written permission: 
$-----------------------------------
2. Money damages, if any, to restore the irrigation ditch to its original 
state: 
$-------------------------------------
As soon as nine or more of you have agreed on the answer, sign and 
date this Verdict Form and notify the Bailiff. If your answer is unanimous, 
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your foreman alone shall sign and date this Verdict Form; but ifnine or 
more but less than the entire jury agree, then those so agreeing shall sign this 
Verdict Form. Please sign your name and list your juror number on the 
lines provided below. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. U 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to 
another or decide any question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or 
drawing of straws. If money damages are to be awarded, you may not agree 
in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the 
method of determining the amount of the damage award. 
(~\) 
Dated: q/!0/0r~~1 ~_ 
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We, the Jury, answer the following question: 
Question No.1: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the 
plaintiffs as a result of the change in the irrigation ditch that was made 
by the Scotts? 
DAMAGES VERDICT FORM 
Od0451 
Answer to Question No.1: We assess plaintiffs' damages as 
follows: 
1. Money damages, if any, for changing the irrigation ditch without 
written permission: 
$_-
2. Money damages, if any, to restore the irrigation ditch to its original 
state: 
$ ,fj) 25'0 -----------------------------------
As soon as nine or more of you have agreed on the answer, sign and 
date this Verdict Form and notify the Bailiff. If your answer is unanimous, 
your foreman alone shall sign and date this Verdict Form; but if nine or 
more but less than the entire jury agree, then those so agreeing shall sign this 
Verdict Form. Please sign your name and list your juror number on the 
lines provided below. 
DATED: 
Foreperson 
DAMAGES VERDICT FORM 
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Shelly H. Cozakos, Bar No. 5374 
SCozakos@perkinscoie.com 
Cynthia L. Yee-Wallace, Bar No. 6793 
CYee Wallace@perkinscoie.com 
PERKINS COIE LLP 
251 East Front Street, Suite 400 




Attorneys for Defendants 
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T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and 




JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT 
(husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
Defendants John R. Scott and Jackie G. Scott ("Defendants"), by and through their 
attorneys of record, Perkins Coie LLP, hereby move the Court, pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to enter Judgment in the Defendants' favor notwithstanding the 
verdict, on the grounds that the jury's verdict rendered on September 16, 2008, is not supported 
by the evidence. 
Defendants intend to file a Memorandum in support of this Motion within fourteen days 
pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT-l 
65685-00011LEGALl468 1 158.1 
000454 
DATED: September 18,2008. 
PERKINS COlE LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on September 5,2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated 
below, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Fl. 







MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
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Shelly H. Cozakos, Bar No. 5374 
SCozakos@perkinscoie.com 
Cynthia L. Yee-Wallace, Bar No. 6793 
CYee Wallace@perkinscoie.com 
PERKINS COIE LLP 
251 East Front Street,Suite 400 
P.O. Box 737 
Boise, ID 83701-0737 
Telephone: 208.343.3434 
Facsimile: 208.343.3232 
Attorneys for Defendants 
F LED - __ A,M. ___ .P.M. 
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O. 6UTl..ER, DEPUTV 
IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRA TION and 




JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT 
(husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHST ANDING THE VERDICT 
Defendants John R. Scott and Jackie G. Scott, (the "Scotts" or "Defendants"), by and 
@002 
through their attorneys of record, Perkins Coie LLP, submit the following memorandum in support 
of Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict and in the alternative in support of Defendants' Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, both of which are pending before the Court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
At the close of Plaintiffs' evidence during each of the three phases of trial in this matter, 
Defendants moved for a directed verdict based upon Plaintiffs' failure to set forth sufficient 
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evidence to prove their cases of action. These motions were taken under advisement by the 
Court. 
Following Phase ill of the trial on damages, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
Plaintiffs, awarding them a combined total of $6,500.00. Tbejury awarded these damages 
despite the fact that Plaintiffs presented no evidence regarding the amount of damages that they 
has suffered. 
Because the jury's verdict awarding an amount of damages is unsupported by the 
evidence, Defendants now request that the Court grant their Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, setting aside the jury's award of damages and entering judgment in 
their favor. 
ll. LEGAL STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) governs motions for directed verdict and states that 
the motion may be made at the close of the evidence, and that an order of the court granting a 
motion for directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. See I.R.C.P. 50(a). 
Motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are governed by Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(b), which Rule gives the court the power to either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment. I.R.C.P. 50(b). A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be 
granted Where there is not substantial or competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury. 
See Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 735, 518 P.2d 1194, 1195 (Idaho 1974). In this 
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case, the jury's verdict awarding damages in the amount of $6,500.00 to Plaintiffs is not 
supported by substantial or competent evidence and thUs, Defendants' motion should be granted. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Defendants Are Entitled To A Directed Verdict OrJNOV On The Basis That 
Plaintiffs Failed To Meet Their Burden Of Proof of Damages. 
1. Damages Must Be Proven To A Reasonable Certainty. 
Idaho Courts have held that a person asserting a claim for damages has the burden of 
proving not only a right to damages, but also the amount of damages. Martsch v. Nelson, 109 
Idaho 95, 100, 705 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added); citing Beare v. 
Stowe's Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317,321,658 P.2d 988, 992 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). 
Further, the amount of damages must be supported by substantial evidence and not based upon 
mere conjecture. Id.; citing Alper v. Stillings, 389 P.2d 239 (Nev. 1964). The evidence must be 
of sufficient quality and probative value that the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that an 
award of such amount was proper. Id. (citation omitted). 
Where the only proof presented on the amount of damages requires that the trier of fact 
make a "blind guess" as to the amount of damages or loss involved, an award of damages is not 
proper. See Beare, 658 P.2d at 992; citing Call v. Coiner, 43 Idaho 320, 251 P. 617 (Idaho 
1926); see also e.g. Powell v. Seliers, 130 Idaho 122,937 P.2d 434 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) 
(upholding the award of damages where the plaintiffs presented evidence of bids reflecting the 
amount to repair the ditch and the amount and value of trees that had been damaged). Similarly, 
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the amount of damages must be established to a reasonable degree of certainty. See Sells v. 
Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 774, 772 P.3d 99, 106 (Idaho 2005). 
2. Defendants Completely Failed To Meet Their Burden Of Proof At Trial 
Regarding Damages For Moving The Ditch. 
@005 
The Jury awarded the Brattons the sum of $2,250.00 in damages to restore the ditch to its 
original state. Under well settled Idaho law, this award should be set aside. During the 
discovery phase of this case, Plaintiffs disclosed that their damages were for the cost of installing 
an underground ditch; re-seeding their pasture; diminution in value to their property; and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. At no time during discovery did Plaintiffs present as 
a claim for damages the costs of "fixing" the ditch, or moving it back to the location they 
claimed it had been pr!0r to the actions of the Scotts. While Plaintiffs referenced that this could 
be a possible remedy, they simply presented no evidence during discovery as to what it would 
cost to relocate the ditch, or in essence to repair the alleged injury to their easement. 
However, folJowing the second phase of the trial, the Jury found no liability on the part of 
the Scotts with respect to the Brattons' claim for breach of privacy and interference by threat of 
harm. The Jury found that the Scotts were negligent, but the negligence did not cause an 
impediment to the water flow in the ditch. Thus, the Srattons could not recover the items of 
damages outlined above, and were left with recovery of damages for repair of their property, or 
more specifically moving the ditch back to the location they claimed it was in. Because the 
Srattons had not disclosed in discovery what this would cost; nor hired an expert to opine on 
these costs or disclosed a lay witness to testify regarding the actual cost of repairing the alleged 
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injury to their property, they were precluded by the Court from presenting such evidence during 
the damages phase of the trial. Nonetheless, the Brattons proceeded with the damages phase of 
the trial and presented witnesses to testify that the ditch needed to be relocated, where the new 
location should be; and some physical attributes of the proposed new ditch. 
However, the Brattons presented no evidence regarding what this would cost. The only 
way the Jury would be able to award a dollar amount to the Brattons would be through 
"guessing" or "speculating" what this might cost. This is improper. See Beare, 658 P.2d at 992. 
The Jury's verdict therefore cannot stand and judgment should be entered in favor of the Scotts. 
3. Damages For Failure To Have Written Permission Should Be Set Aside. 
The Jury also placed an arbitrary number of $4,250.00 in damages for the Scotts failure 
to obtain written permission prior to the alleged move to the ditch. This award is not supported 
by the law. This section was included in the Special Verdict Form by the Court pursuant to 
section 42-1207 of the Idaho Code, which requires written permission of ditch owners prior to 
moving or changing the ditch. Yet under Allen v. Burggraf/Construction Co., 106 Idaho 451, 
452,680 P.2d 873, 874 (1984), before recovery can be had based upon negligence or violation of 
section 42-1207, the landowners are "required to show that relocation of the ditch actually 
caused a diminished flow of water to their properties." The Court went on to state that "[p ]roof 
of causation is essential to invoke the statute." Id. Thus, unless the Brattons were able to show 
an impeded water flow, they cannot establish causation as a matter oflaw. Ifunable to establish 
causation in a negligence action, or action under section 42-1207, no damages can be awarded -
whether those damages are compensatory or nominal damages. Moreover, in Weaver v. Stafford, 
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134 Idaho 691, 700, & P.3d 1234, 1243 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the plaintiff 
could not recover any damages under section 42-1207 of the Idaho Code because he failed to 
introduce any evidence of the historic flow rate of water to his property before and after the 
changes to the lateral ditch. The Court noted that section 42-1207 prohibits altering an irrigation 
ditch "in a manner which impedes the flow of water." Id 
The Court indicated during previous argument that it would be proper for the Jury to 
award nominal damages under section 42-1207 in the absence of actual damages, if the Scotts 
failed to obtain written permission to change the ditch. The Court indicated that changes to the 
portion of section 42-1207 regarding obtaining ':Vritten permission had been changed by the 
Legislature in 2002, and so Allen and Weaver, supra, did not apply. However, upon a review of 
the relevant legislative history of section 42-1207, the requirement of written permission was 
present in the statute at the time the Allen and Weaver decisions were issued. In the year 2002, 
the Legislature changed the sentence regarding written permission, however the change only 
related to the written permission of the irrigation entity versus the owner of the ditch. Thus, at 
the time the Allen and Weaver opinions were issued, section 42-1207 read as follows: 
In the event that the ditch, lateral, buried irrigation conduit, or 
canal is owned by an irrigation district, canal company, ditch 
association, or other irrigation entity, the written permission of the 
entity must first be obtained before a ditch, lateral, buried irrigation 
conduit, or canal is changed or placed in buried pipe by the 
landowner. 
See, House Bill No. 566, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Following an amendment effective"July 
1, 2002, the relevant portion of section 42-1207 reads as follows: 
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The written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain 
or buried irrigation conduit must fIrst be obtained before it is 
changed or placed in buried pipe by the landowner. 
The Statement of Purpose attached to the House Bill states that is "to extend the current 
prohibition on interference with ditches and canals to laterals and drains." The Statement of 
Purpose goes on to state that it is to "provide for changes to ditches, canals, laterals and drains 
. under certa.in circumstances." Id The changes to the statute in 2002 therefore did nothing more 
than clarify who written permission must be obtained from. The stated purpose of the changes 
had nothing to do with providing additional burdens upon landowners who sought to change the 
location of, or bury, an irrigation ditch provided that there is no impediment to flow of water. 
The written permission requirement was in place when Allen, Weaver, and Savage Lateral Ditch' 
Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,869 P.2d 554 (1994) were issued. 
Thus, as a matter of law the Brattons could not satisfy the causation element of their 
negligence action unless they could show impeded water flow. Not only did they fail to do so, 
the Jury specifically found that the water flow had not been impeded. Thus, the damages award 
should be set aside and judgment entered in favor of the Scotts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants hereby request thatthe Court grant their Motion for 
Directed Verdict or in the alternative, that the Court grant Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
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DATED: October 2, 2008. 
PERKINS COlE LLP 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on September 5, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated 
below, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th FI. 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
FAX: 385-5384 
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I III LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I/fl 
Fifty-sixth Legislature Second Regular Session - 2002 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 566 
BY RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
@j012 
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2 RELATING TO CONTROL OF DITCHES, CANALS, LATERALS AND DRAINS; AMENDING SECTIO 
3 18-4301, IDAHO CODE, T~ EXTEND PROHIBITION ON INTERFERENCE WITH DITCHE 
4 AND CANALS TO LATERALS AND DRAINS; AMENDING SECTION 18-4306, IDAHO CODE 
5 TO EXTEND PENALTIES FOR INJURIES TO CANALS., LATERALS AND DRAINS WHIC 
6 APPLY TO INJURIES TO DITCHES; AMENDING SECTION 18-4308, IDAHO· CODE, T 
7 PROVIDE FOR CHANGE OR BURIAL OF CANALS, LATERALS, AND DRAINS; AND AMENDIN 
8 SECTION 42-1207, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR CHANGE OR BURIAL OF CANALS 
9 LATERALS AND DRAINS. 
10 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
11 SECTION 1. That Section 18-4301, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereb 
12 amended to read as follows: 
13 18-4301. INTERFERENCE WITH DITCHES, CANALS, -LATERALS, DRAINS OR RESER 
14 VOIRS. Every person who shall, without authority of the owner or managin 
15 agent, and with intent to defraud, take water from any canal, ditch, lateral 
16 drain, flume or reservoir, used for the purpose of holding r draining or con 
17 v.eying water for manufacturing, agricultural, mining, or domestic uses, or wh 
http://www3.state.id.usloasis/2002IH0566.html 1012/2008 
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18 shall, without like authority, raise, lower, or otherwise disturb, any gate 0 
19 other appurtenance thereof used for the control or measurement of water, 0 
20 who shall empty or place, or cause to be emptied or placed, into any sue 
21 canal, ditch, lateral, drain, flume, or reservoir, any rubbish, filth, 0 
22 obstruction to the free flow of water, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
23 SECTION 2. That Section 18~4306, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereb 
24 amended to read as follows: 
25 18-4306. INJURIES TO DITCHES, CANALS, LATERALS, DRAINS AND APPURT.ENANCES 
26 Any person or persons, who shall cut, break, damage, or in any way inter fer 
27 with any ditch, canal, lateral, drain, headgate, ~ any other works in 0 
28 appurtenant thereto, or cut, break, damage or in any way interfere with th 
29 bank of any ditch, canal, lateral or drain, the property of another person 
30 irrigation district, drainage district, canal company, corporation, or associ 
31 ation of persons, and whereby water is conducted to any place for beneficia 
32 use or purposes, and when said canal, headgate, ditch, lateral, drain, dam, 0 
33 appurtenance is being used or is to be used for said conduct or drainage 0 
34 water, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
35 SECTION 3. That Section 18-4308, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereb 
36 amended to read as follows; 
37 18-4308~ CHANGE OF &'i~Ab DITCH, CANA,J:., LATERAL, DRAIN OR BURIED IRRIGA 
38 TrON CONDUIT. Where any laeseal ditch, canal, lateral or drain has heretofor 
39 been, or may hereafter be, constructed across or beneath the lands of another 
2 
1 the person or persons owning or controlling the said land, shall have th 
2 right at his own expense to Change saiq laeeeal ditch, canal, 1ateral, drai 
3 or buried irrigation conduit to any other part of said land, but such chang 
4 must be made in. such a manner as not to impede the flow of the water therein 
5 or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such ~ 
6 ~ ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit. Any increase 
7 operation and maintenance shall be. the responsibility of the landowner wh 
8 makes the change. 
9 A landowner shall also have the right· to bury the ditch, canal, lateral 0 
10 drain of another in pipe on the landowner's property, provided that the pipe 
11 installation and backfill reasonably meet standard specifications for suc 
12 materials and construction, as set forth in the Idaho standards for publi 
13 works construction or other standards recognized by the city or county i 
14 which the burying is to be done. The right and responsibility for oper!'ltio 
15 and maintenance shall remain with the ~ owner of the ditch, canal, latera 
16 or drain, but the landowner shall be responsible for any increased operatio 
17 and maintenance costs, including rehabilitation and replacement, unless other 
18 wise agreed in writing with the ~ owner. 
19 IA 6Bes'J'siiS e.loa!; elite siitel!, laeseal, :l!ltu'is€i ielfj,§'<isiElii eeJ'lsil!lie, se saiia 
20 is eWfl8S By <iii s:l!'!faFlis8S ieei!faeisR siisteise; €lanai eSilII:JaJ'iY, €iiseR assssia 
21 eisn; se seMse iEei§,aSis}.l 8iiSisy, efhe written perm.tssion of the Cll'lBit:>' ~ 
22 of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit must first b 
23 obtained before a €ii$s.R., laeeeal, sl!Ieiss iJ!'ei!fa.eis:H 88iiSb1i6; ElJ!' sa l'l a 1 it i 
24 changed or placed in buried pipe by the landowner. 
25 While a siesR the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral!. drain or buried irri 
26 qation conduit shall have no right to relocate ~is siseA it on the propert 
27 of another without permission, a ditch, canal, lateral or drain owner shal 
'28. have the right to place litis siis~ it in a buried conduit within the easemen 
29 or right-of-way on the property of another in accordance with standard speci 
30 fications for pipe, materials, installation and backfill, as set forth in th 
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32 the city or county in which the burying is to be done, and so long as the pip 
33 and the construction is accomplished in a manner that the surface of th 
34 owner's property and the owner's use thereof is not disrupted and is restore 
35 to the condition of adjacent property as expeditiously as possible, but not t 
36 exceed five (5) days after the start of construction. A landowner shall hav 
37 .the right to direct that the conduit be relocated to a different route tha 
38 the route of the ditch, canal, lateral or drain, provided that. the landowne 
39 shall agree in writing to be responsible for any increased construction 0 
40 future maintenance costs necessitated by said relocation. Maintenance of th 
41 buried conduit shall be the responsibility of the ~ conduit owner. 
42 No more than five (5) days after the sta~t of construction, a landowner 0 
43 ditch owner who buries a ditch, canal', lateral or drain in pipe shall racor 
44 the location and specifications of the buried irrigation or drainage conduit 
45 including primary and secondary easements, in the county in which the buryin 
46 is done, and shall provide the irrigation or drainage entity that 8~Iie 
47 Ilete:!' 68 ~ the ditch, canal, lateral, or drain, with a copy of such Ioca 
48 tion and specifications and the construction plans utilized. The irrigation Q 
49 drainage entity shall keep and maintain such records and have them availabl 
50 for the public. 
51 Any person or persons who relocate or bury a lateral ditch, canal, latera 
52 or drain contrary to the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a mis 
53 demeanor. 
54 SECTION 4. That Section 42-1207, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereb 
3 
1 amended to read as follows: 
2 42-1207. CHANGE OF lsllPEo." .. i',J; DITCH, CANAL, LATERAL, DRAIN OR BURIED IRRIGA 
3 TION CONDUIT. Where any Io9teral ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irri 
4 gation conduit has heretofore been, or may hereafter be, constructed across 0 
5 beneath the lands of another, the person or persons owning or controlling sai 
6 land shall have the right at their own expense to change said 18ss:!'81 ditch 
7 canal, lateral or drain or buried irrig.ation conduit to any other part of sai 
S ,land, but such change must be made in such ,a manner as not to impede the flo 
9 of the water therein, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using 0 
10 interested in such laes:!'al ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigatio 
11 conduit. Any increased operation and maintenance shall be the responsibilit 
12 of the landowner who makes the change. 
13 A landowner shall also have the right to bury the ditch, canal, lateral 0 
14 drain of another in pipe on the landowner's property, provided ·that the pipe 
15 installation and backfill reasonably meet standard specifications for suc 
16 materials and construction, as set forth in the Idaho standards for publi 
17 works construction or other standards recognized by the city or county i 
18 which the burying is to be done. The right and responsibility for operatio 
19 and maintenance shall remain with the ~ owner of the ditch, canal, latera 
20 or drain, but the landowner shall be responsible for any increased operatio 
21 and maintenance costs, including rehabilitation and replacement, unless other. 
22 wise agreed in writing with the ~ owner. 
23 H EBS 1ii\'SAS tiBati tile elissJ:1, iasEI:!'8i, :81!1:!'ieel i:P.:!'i!fasieR eSJieli:lis, 8* saA8 
24 is eWRse :8;' aA 8:!'!f8fli8eeli:!'f4~tiiSR eist:!'i8S; saBa1 8SMpaRY, elit~~ o98888i8 
25 heR, sr86tie:!' i:!':!'i~atieP.l sRsitj'; tThe written permission of the Sl'ltie}, owne 
26 of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit must first b 
27 obtained before a elitBJ:l; lats:!'dl, :8w:!'iEle l:!':!'i~ti8Ii 88Rell!lie, s:!' 8anal it i 
28 changed or placed in buried pipe by the landowner. 
29 While 8 tiisSofi the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irri 
30 gation conduit shall have no right to relocate tiis alssA it on the property 0 
31 another without permission, a ditch, canal, lateral or drain owner shall hav 
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33 right-of-way on the property of another in accordance with standard specifica 
34 tions for pipe, materials, installation and backfill, as set' forth in th 
35 Idaho standards for public works construction or other standards recognized b 
36 the city or county in which the burying is to be done, and so long as the pip 
37 and the construction is accomplished in a manner that the surface of th 
38 owner's property and the owner's use thereof is not disrupted and is restore 
39 to the condition of adjacent property as expeditiously as possible, but not t 
40 'exceed five (S) days after the start of construction. A landowner shall hav ' 
41 the right to direct that the conduit be relocated to a different route tha 
42 the route of the ditch, canal, lateral or drain, provided that the landowne 
43 shall agree in writing to be responsible for any increased construction 0 
44 future maintenance costs necessitated by said relocation. Maintenance of th 
45 buried conduit shall be the responsibility of the ~ conduit owner. 
46 No more than five (S) days after the start of construction, a landowner 0 
47 ditch owner who buries a ditch, canal, lateral, or drain in pipe shall racor 
48 the location and specifications of the buried irrigation or drainage conduit 
49 including primary and secondary easements, in the county in which the buryin 
50 is done, and shall provide the irrigation or drainage entity that 8s~li8 
51 IMSSE S8 ~ the ditch, canal, lateral or drain, with' a copy of such loc~tio 
52 and specifications and th~, construction plans utilized. The irrigation' 2 
53 drainage entity shall keep and maintain such records and have them availabl 
54 for the public. 
Amendment 
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Fifty-sixth Legislature Second Regular Session - 2002 
Moved by Burtenshaw 
Seconded by Stennett 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.B. NO. 566 





On, page 1 of the printed bill, in line 26, 
"willfullv" ; in line 27" delete r~~" and insert: 
lowing "thereto," delete the remainder of the line 
"bank of any ditch, canal, lateral or drain,". 
following "shall" insert 
"or"; and in line 28, fol 
and in line 29, delet 
Engrossed Bill (Original Bill with Amendment(s) Incorporated) 
I I t I LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I I II 
Fifty-sixth ,Legislature Second Regular Session - 2002 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 566, As Amended in the Senate 
http://www3.state.id.usioasisl2002IH0566.html 000469 IO/21200R 
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BY RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
l4l 016 
Page 6 of9 
2 RELATING TO CONTROL OF DITCHES, CANALS, LATERALS AND DRAINS; AMENDING SECTIO 
3 18-4301, IDAHO CODE, TO EXTEND PROHIBITION ON INTERFERENCE WITH DITCHE 
4 AND CANALS TO LATERALS AND DRAINS; AMENDING SECTION 18-'4306, IDAHO CODE 
5 TO EXTEND PENALTIES FOR INJURIES TO CANALS, LATERALS AND DRAINS WHIC 
6 APPLY TO INJURIES TO DITCHES; AMENDING SECTION 18-4308, IDAHO CODE, T 
7 PROVIDE FOR CHANGE OR BURIAL OF CANALS, LATERALS, AND DRAINS; AND AMENDIN 
8 SECTION 42-1207, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR CHANGE OR BU~IAL OF CANALS 
9 LATERALS AND DRAINS. 
10 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
11 SECTION 1. That Section 18-4301, Idaho Code, be, and the same is he reb 
12 amended to read as follows: 
13 18-4301. INTERFERENCE WITH DITCHES, CANALS, LATERALS, DRAINS OR RESER 
14 VOIRS. Every person who shall, without authority of the owner or mana gin 
15 agent, and with intent to defraud, take water from any canal, ditch, ~ateral. 
16 drain, flume or reservoir, used for the purpose of holding, draining or con 
17 veying water for manufacturing, agricultural, mining, or domestic uses, or wh 
18 shall, without like authority, raise, lower, or otherwise disturb, any gate 0 
19 other appurtenance thereof used for the control or measurement of water, 0, 
20 who shall empty or place, or cause to be emptied or placed, into any suc 
21 canal, ditch~ latera~, drain, flume, or reservoir, any rubbish, filth, 0 
22 obstruction to the free flow of water, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
23 SECTION 2. That Section 18-4306, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereb 
24. amended to read as follows: 
25 18-4306. INJURIES TO DIT~HES, CANALS, LATERALS, DRAINS AND APPURTENANCES 
26 Any person or persons, who shall wi~lful~y cut, break, damage, or in any wa 
27 interfere with any ditch, canal, ~ateral., drain, headgate, or any other work 
28 in or appurtenant thereto, the property of another person, irrigation dis 
29 trict, drainage district, canal company, corporation, or association of pe~ 
30 sons, and whereby water is conducted to any place for beneficial use or pur 
31 ,poses, and when said canal,headgate, ditch, ~ateral, drainc dam, or appurte 
32 nance is being used or is to be used for said conduct or drainage of water 
33 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
34 SECTION 3. That Section 18-4308, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hersb 
35 amended to read as follows: 
36 18-4308. CHANGE OF 15APEA.'lJ5 DITCH, CANAL, LM!ERAL, DRAIN OR BURIED IRRIGA 
37 TION CONDUIT. Where any lateral ditch, can~, lateral. or drain has heretofor 
38 been, or may hereafter be, constructed across or beneath the lands of another 
39 the person or persons owning or controlling the said land, shall have th 
2 
1 right at his own expense to change said Ideexal ditch, cana~, lateral, drai 
2 or buried irrigation conduit to any other part of $aid land, but such chang 
3 must be made in such a manner as not to impede the flow of the water therein 
4 or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in such ~ 
5 ~ ditch, cana~, lateral c drain or buried irrigation conduit. Any increase 
6 operation and maintenance shall be the responsibility of the landowner wh 
7 makes the change. 
S A landowner shall also have the right to bury the ditch, canal., latera~ 0 
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installation and backfill reasonably meet standard specifications for suc 
materials and construction, as set forth in the Idaho standards for publi 
works construction or other standards recognized by the city or county i 
which the burying is to be don~. The right and responsibility for operatio 
and maintenance shall remain with the ~ owner of the ditch, canal, latera 
or drain, but the landowner shall be responsible for any increased ope ratio 
and maintenance costs, including rehabilitation and replacement, unless other 
wise agreed in writing with the ~ owner. 
LA ,;;liS 13','13"''' "Bas tAs 81tM, lass:l!'sl, 811:(is8 i:l!':l!'ifdSil!JrA 891<8111/;;; 9:l!' 8ii!Ra 
is Elh'AS8 B:Y 121') 8:l!'fdAi8S8 io!'o!'i~ati8:/! 8is/;;:l!'ie/;;; eSAal 88BifJ8:82'; 8iteR 128888112 
eiSA, SE' S"AIi:l!' iE'E'ifd/;;isA sifei/;;),; s!I'he written permission of the @Asis), ~ 
of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit must first b 
obtained before B 81teR; la/;;Ii:l!'al, BNri@8 1:l!':l!':i~a5i8R SSA8liiE; So!' saRal it i 
changed or placed in buried pipe by the landowner. 
While iii 8itsh the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irri 
qationconduit shall have no right to relocate his Eiis8h it on the propert 
of another without permission, a ditch, canal, lateral or drain owner shal 
have the right to place Ais Eiis~ it in a buried conduit within the easemen 
or right-of-way on the property of another in accordance with standard speci 
fications for pipe, materials, installation and backfill, as set forth inth 
Idaho standards for public works construction or other standards recognized b 
the city or county in which the burying lsto be done, and so long as the pip 
and the construction is accomplished in a manner that the surface of th 
owner's property and the owner's use thereof is not disrupted and is restore 
to the condition of adjacent property as expeditiously as possible, but not t 
exceed five (5) days after the start of construction. A landowner shall hav 
the right ,to direct that the conduit be relocated to a different route tha 
the route of the ditch, canal, latera~ or drain, provided that the landowne 
shall agree in writing to be responsible for any increased construction 0 
future maintenance costs necessitated by said relocation. Maintenance of th 
buried conduit shall be the responsibility of the ~ conduit owner. 
No more than five (5) days after the start of construction, a landowner 0 
ditch owner who buries a ditch, canal, lateral or drain'in pipe shall recor 
the location and specifications of the buried irrigation or drainage conduit 
including primary and secondary easements, in the county in which the buryin 
is done, and shall provide the irrigation or drainage entity that 8~lis 
h'dESE' 59 owns the ditch, canal, lateral, or drain, with a copy of such loca 
tion and specifications and the construction plans utilized. The irrigation 2 
drainage entity shall keep and maintain such records arid have them availabl 
for the public. 
Any person or persons who relocate or bury a lae9:l!'al ditch, canal, latera 
or drain contrary to the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a mis 
~emeanor. 
!'),j SECTION 4. That Section 42-1207, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereb 
54 amended to read as follows: 
3 
1 42-1207. CHANGE OF Isll'PBIMIs DITCH, CANAL, LA'q'RAL, DRAIN OR BURIED IRRIGA 
2 TION CONDUIT. Where any las9:l!'al ditch, cana~, lateral or drain or buried irri 
3 gation conduit has heretofore been, or may hereafter be, constructed across 0 
4 beneath the lands of another, the person or persons owning or controlling sai 
5 land shall have the right at their own expense to change said lass:l!'al ,ditch 
6 canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation conduit to any other part of sai 
7 land, but such change must be made in such a manner as not to impede the flo 
8 of the water therein, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using 0 
9 interested in such las8:l!'al ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigatio 
10 conduit. Any increased operation and maintenance shall be the responsibilit 
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12 A landowner shall also have the right to bury the ditch, canal, lateral 0 
13 drain of another in pipe on the landowner's property, provided that the pipe 
14 installation and backfill reasonably meet standard specifications for suc 
15 materials and construction, as set forth in the Idaho standards for publi 
16 works construction or other standards recognized by the city or county i 
17 which the burying is to be done. The right and responsibility for operatio 
18 and maintenance shall remain with the ~ owner of the ditch, canal, latera 
19 or drain, but the landowner shall be responsible for any increased operatio 
20 and maintenance costs, including rehabilitation and replacement, unless other 
I 21 wise agreed in writing with the ~ owner. 
22 l'Ji iliS EiVTS"'S SAliS sAs t:iits8B, llit8L'al, lo!iF:ies iFFi~lifjji8Ji 8SMSYis, BF SCiJiCi 
23 is B10'118S loy aM SF~iil'liB'et:i iFFi~aEi8:Fl eiietFiss; sa:Flel eSliI}3ii:Rj'; sittHl. aSB8!sia 
24 Eieh'~, SE SsliS:if i:if:ifi~iil6i:s1'l O:Fltisj', sThe written permission af the o:FlMs:1' ~ 
25 of a-ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit must first b 
26 obtained before Ii t:i4tSB, llit8Flil, lo!i:ifiot:i i:if:ifi~asis:Fl ss",t:i!iit; SL' eB:Fliill it i 
27 changed or placed in buried pipe by the landowner. 
28 While iii sitSR the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irri 
29 gation conduit shall have no right to relocate BiB sit8B it on the property 0 
30 another without permission, a ditch, canal, lateral or drain owner shall hav 
31 the right to place liis t:iiie.8 it in a buried conduit within the easement 0 
32 right-of-way on the property of another in accordance with standard specifica 
33 tions for pipe, materials, installation and backfill, as set forth in th 
34 Idaho standards for public works construction or other standards recognized b 
35 the city or county in which the burying is to be done, and so long as the pip 
36 and the construction is accomplished in a manner that the surface of th 
37 owner's property and the owner's use thereof is not disrupted and is restore 
38 to the condition of adjacent property as expeditiously as possible, but not t 
39 exceed five (5) days after the start of construction. A landowner shall hav 
40 the right to direct that the conduit be relocated to a different route tha 
41 the route of the ditch, canal, lateral or drain, provided that the landowne 
42 shall agree in writing to be responsible for any increased construction 0 
43 future maintenance costs necessitated by said relocation. Maintenance of th 
44 buried conduit shall be the responsibility of the ~ conduit owner. 
45 No more than five (5) days after the start of construction,a landowner 0 
46 ditch owner who buries a ditch, canal, lateral, or drain in pipe shall recor 
47 the location and specifications of the buried irrigation or drainage conduit 
48 including primary and secondary easements, in the county in which the buryin 
49 is done, and shall provide the irrigation or drainage entity that s~~lie 
50 I:'Qt;;O:if 5S owns the ditch, canal, lateral or drain, with a copy of such locatio 
51 and specifications and the construction plans utilized. The irrigation 2 
52 drainage entity shall keep and maintain such records and have them availabl 
53 for the public. 
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 11837Cl 
This legislation would extend the current prohibition on 
interference with ditches and canals to laterals and drains. 
Finally, it would provide for changes to ditches, canals, 
laterals and drains under certain circumstances. Violation of 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
()1-\ DEPUTY 
IN TIffi DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and 




JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT 
(husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821 C 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
Defendants John R. Scott and Jackie G. Scott, (the "Scotts" or "Defendants"), by and 
through their attorneys of record, Perkins Coie LLP, submit the following supplemental 
memorandum in support of Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict and in the alternative in 
support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, both of which are 
pending before the Court. 
In Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' motions for directed verdict or, in 
the alternative, JNOV, Defendants referenced certain legislative history relating to section 42-
1207 of the Idaho Code, which legislative history was obtained online by Defendants' counsel 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN THE AL TERNA TIVE IN 





and attached to the Memorandum. However, upon additional research, Plaintiffs obtained 
additional legislative history for the statute not available through the online services, which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
Defendants argued that one of the bases to set aside the Jury's verdict of $4,250 for 
\ 
failure of the Scotts to obtain written permission was pursuant to Allen v. Burggraf! Construction 
Co., 106 Idaho 451, 452, 680 P.2d 873, 874 (1984), wherein the Idaho Supreme Court stated that 
a plaintiff must prevent proof of causation of harm under the statute via impeded water flow 
before recovery can be had. Defendants then argued that the written pennission requirement 
with respect to irrigation district entities had been in place at the time the Allen decision was 
rendered in 1984. However, this was an incorrect statement. The JditionallegiSlative history 
attached hereto shows that the written permission requirement was added to section 42-1207 in 
1994. This is also true of Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,869 
P.2d 554 (1994). 
However, the opinion of Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 700, 8 P.3d 1234, 1243 
(2000) was issued after the addition the statute that written permission of an irrigation district 
entity must be obtained before changing a ditch. In Weaver, the Court made clear that absent 
evidence of a reduction of the historic flow of water, there can be no recovery under section 42-
1207. ld. 
In addition, the Jury's verdict of $4,250 for failure of the Scotts to obtain written 
permission is arguably not nominal. It is $2,000 higher than the Jury's assessed damages for 
repairing the ditch, and therefore seems more punitive in nature,which is not allowed for under 
SupPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN THE AL TERNA TIVE IN 
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the statute. The caselaw interpreting the statute make clear that causation must be proven before 
recovery can be obtained for violations of the statute. Without impeded water flow, there is no 
causation and no damages are recoverable. The Jury's verdict should therefore be set aside. 
DATED: October 3, 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on October 3, 2008, I ca:used a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below, 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Fl. 




. U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Overnight Mail 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN THE AL lERNA TIVE IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT-3 
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IDAHO SESSION LAWS 
CHAPTER 151 
(S.B. No. , 1474) 
AN ACT 
345 
TO MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF DITCHES; AMENDING SECTION 
, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW A I.AIiooWNER TO BURY AS WELL AS MOVE 
~ll~~i&.AU"''''''' DITCH OR BURIED IRRIGATION CONDUIT OF ANOTHER ON HIS OWN 
TO REQUIRE CONSTRUCTION BE AT STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS 
THE LANDOWNER ASSUME INCREASED OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE 
, TO PROVIDE THAT WRITTEN PERMISSION MUST FIRST BE OBTAINED 
AN ORGANIZED IRRIGATION ENTITY; AND AMENDING SECTION 18-4308, 
CODE, TO ALLOW A DITCH OWNER TO BURY HIS DITCH ON THE PROP-
A LANDOWNER SERVIENT TO SUCH DITCH EASEMENT SO LONG AS THE 
iDIUliUCTI()N IS AT STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS AND THE PIPELINE IS 
UNDERNEATH THE EXISTING DITCH. TO PROVIDE THAT THE LAND-
CAN REQUEST A REROUTING IF HE WILL AGREE IN WRITING TO PAY 
RbDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND INCREASED FUTURE MAINTENANCE 
TO PROVIDE FOR RECORDIN,G OF BURYING LOCATION , AND SPECIFlCA-
TO REQUIRE ,THAT THE LANDOWNER OR DITCH OWNER PROVIDE A COpy 
TO THE SUPPLYING IRRIGATION ENTITY, AND TO REQUIRE 
l GA.TICIN ENTITIES TO KEEP AND MAINTAIN SUCH RECORDS AND HAVE 
AVAILABLE FOR THE PUBLIC. 
ed by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
1. That Section 4'2-1207. Idaho Code. be. and the same is 
;e-.alde,d , to read as follows: 
CHANGE OF LATERAL DITCH OR BURIED IRRIGATION CONDUIT. 
ditch or buried irrigation conduit has heretofore 
may ,hereafter be, constructed across or beneath the lands of' 
the person ,or persons owning or controlling tae said land 
the right at th~ir own ,expense to change ' said lateral ditch 
~~--!.!:I!~El:~~!.!!!l~~ to any other part of said land, but such 
a manner as not to impede the flow of ' the 
ot,herwise injure 
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That Se~tion 18-4308, 
hereby amended to read a~·· follows: 
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IDAHO .SESSION LAWS 347 
CHAPtER 152 
(S.B. No. 1508, A, Amended) 
AN ACT 
TO FUNDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF tHE FOREST PRACTICES 
AHtNDIHG SECTION 38-122, IDAHO . CODE, to PROVIDE FOR A DEDUC-
FROM THE SLASS HAZARD -BOND TO .FUND FORESt PRACTICES ACT 
~STB.A!ION AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
the Legi.latu~e of the State of Idaho: 
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Nancy J. Garrett, ISB No. 4026 
Andrew J. Waldera, ISB No. 6608 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
njg@moffatt.com 
23655.0000 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
CHARLES E. BRATTON and MARJORIE 1. 
BRATTON, husband and wife, Case No. CV 0706821C 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT, 
husband and wife, 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT OR ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT 
Defendants. 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Charles and Matjorie Bratton (collectively "Brattons"), 
by and through undersigned counsel of record and pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 7(b)(3), 50(a), and 50(b), and hereby file this response in opposition to the 
Defendants' (collectively "Scotts") Motion for a Directed Verdict, or alternative Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and corresponding memorandum (collectively "Motion") 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OR ALTERNATIVE MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 1 
000480 
Client: 1 020040.1 
filed with the Court on or about October 2, 2008. lOver the continual objections of the plaintiffs, 
this trial was divided into three segments after initially advising the parties that the Court would 
not segment or bifurcate the trial ifthere were an objection by either party. The Court later 
revised its position and, over the continual objection of plaintiffs, divided the trial into three 
segments. The first segment would deal with the size of the easement. The second segment 
would encompass liability. The third segment would address damages. At each segment the 
parties were allowed opening and closing statements and allowed to argue jury instructions. The 
same jury would return each segment's verdict. 
It was difficult to discern just where evidence would start and stop in each 
segment. During the third segment, the Court sua sponte stopped plaintiffs' counsel in mid-
examination of a witness. The Court determined that the specific evidence had already been 
admitted and asked the jury for a show of hands on whether they had heard the evidence. After 
the show of hands, the Court instructed plaintiffs' counsel to move to other evidence. This sua 
sponte advisement by the Court shows unequivocally that the Court allowed and actually 
required the jury to utilize all evidence offered in each segment. Therefore, when this jury made 
its final determination, it did so based on all the evidence from all three segments. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
This case began on September 3,2008, and concluded on September 16 after 
seven trial days. There were three verdicts rendered. On September 4 and 11, 2008, and on or 
I The Scotts also filed a supplemental memorandum in support with the Court on 
October 3, 2008. However, that supplemental memorandum does not substantively alter the 
arguments presented in the primary memorandum in support of their motions. 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OR AL TERNA TIVE MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT - 2 
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rtf 
about September 16, 2008, the jury in this matter made several findings. More specifically, and 
with respect to the Brattons' irrigation ditch, the jury found: 
• the Brattons did not prove the existence of a twelve (12) foot wide implied 
easement; 
• the Scotts did change the Brattons' irrigation ditch; 
• the Scotts' change of the irrigation ditch was without the requisite 
prior written pennission ofthe Brattons pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 41-1207; 
• the Scotts' change of the irrigation ditch amounted to negligent 
interference with the Brattons' irrigation easement; and 
• though the Scotts' negligent interference did not diminish the flow of 
water to the Brattons' property; and 
• the Scotts' negligent interference was a proximate cause ofhann to the 
Brattons. 
See Verdict Fonn (filed September 4,2008) and Special Verdict Fonn (filed September 11, 
2008). After finding the Scotts liable for hanning the Brattons as a direct result of their negligent 
interference with the Brattons' irrigation ditch and corresponding easement, as well as the Scotts' 
failure to secure the Brattons' written pennission prior to changing the location of the Brattons' 
irrigation ditch pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-1207, the jury awarded the Brattons the sum 
total of $6,500.00 in damages. See Damages Verdict Fonn (filed on or about September 16, 
2008). The jury decided that it would cost $2,250.00 to restore the Brattons' irrigation ditch to 
its original state and location, and that the Brattons were further entitled to $4,250.00 of 
additional damages as recompense for the Scotts' failure to secure the Brattons' prior written 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OR ALTERNATIVE MOTION 
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pennission under Idaho Code Section 42-1207 and before unilaterally changing the Brattons' 
irrigation ditch. [d. 
There was an abundance of evidence presented to the jury to justify verdicts 2 and 
3. The plaintiffs presented factual and expert testimony as to each of the second and third 
segments to support the jury's respective verdicts. The defendants did not call any witnesses or 
offer any evidence in the final segment of the trial to rebut any of the plaintiffs' evidence. 
The Scotts filed their Motion under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 50(a) 
and 5 O(b) asserting that the jury's damages award is not supported by the record evidence 
because the Brattons' alleged damages were not proven to a reasonable certainty. (Motion at 3-
4.) More specifically, the Scotts contend that (1) the Brattons failed to introduce any evidence 
whatsoever as to what it would cost to restore the ditch to its original location and condition 
(Motion at 4-5), and (2) recovery of damages under either a negligence theory or under Idaho 
Code Section 42-1207 requires a showing of impeded or diminished water flow in the subject 
irrigation ditch as a condition precedent to recovery (Motion at 5-7). 
Upon objection by defendants, the Court excluded any and all evidence as to the 
cost of replacing the Bratton ditch, cost or evidence on rehabilitating the pasture, or any other 
damage evidence or cost thereto. Therefore, the only damage evidence the plaintiffs could offer 
in the third segment was the evidence on reconstructing the ditch. But, by the Court's own 
direction, the jury could utilize all other evidence it had been offered in the first two segments, 
which included evidence of pasture death, anxiety, fear, and other damages of loss of food and 
nutrition for the horses. 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
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II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Legal Standards Of Rules 50(a) And 50(b) 
For all practical purposes, a Rule 50(a) motion for directed verdict and a 
Rule 50(b) motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict are one and the same given that 
they seek largely the same relief; the exception is timing. See, e.g., Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 
759, 763 (1986), and Smith v. Big Lost River Irr. Dist., 83 Idaho 374, 391 (1961). Consequently, 
the legal standards governing the consideration of both motions is the same. Quick, 111 Idaho at 
763. 
In making either motion, the movant admits the truth of the adversary's evidence 
and every legitimate inference that could be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party. Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, the trial judge is not permitted to weight 
the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses and make his or her own separate findings 
of fact for comparison with those of the jury. Id. at 763 (citation omitted, emphasis added). 
Moreover, the trial court should not take a case from the jury unless, as a matter of law, no 
recovery could be had upon any view which properly could be taken of the evidence. Smith,83 
Idaho at 391, citing Stearns v. Graves, 62 Idaho 312 (1941). This is particularly true of 
motions implicating findings of proximate cause. Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 107 
Idaho 701, 704 (1984) (citation omitted, emphasis added). As is of record, the verdict on 
proximate cause was a unanimous verdict of twelve jurors, which verdict led to the third segment 
of trial on damages. 
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B. The Jury Process, Common Knowledge, And Damage Awards 
As the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals both continu, it is 
the very nature of the jury process for jurors to bring with them into the jury room their general 
life experiences, and a sense of what is and is not reasonable in light of those experiences and in 
light of the facts before them. See Quick, 111 Idaho at 765; see also, Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 
Idaho 887, 890 (Ct. App. 1988). Consequently, when considering trial evidence and reaching a 
verdict, jurors are penuitted and expected to take into account matters of common knowledge 
and experience. State v. Espinoza, 133 Idaho 618, 622 (Ct. App. 1999). In other words, the 
members of this jury, when reaching a verdict, are penuitted to apply their own experience and 
their own common knowledge. 
Damage awards, particularly damage awards in tort actions, are primarily a 
question for the jury. See Gonzales v. Hodson, 91 Idaho 330, 334 (1966); see also, Bentzinger v. 
McMurtrey, 100 Idaho 273, 274 (1979). This is because damages are oftentimes susceptible to 
proof only with an approximation of certainty. See Shrum v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 252, 256 
(1950) (citation omitted, emphasis added); see also, Gonzales and Bentzinger, supra. As a 
result, it is solely for the jury to estimate damages as best they can by reasonable probabilities, 
and based upon their sound judgment as to what would be just and proper under all of the 
circumstances. Shrum, 70 Idaho at 256, quoting Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792 (1937). Jury 
verdicts are not to be disturbed absent a showing of bias or prejudice. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
In this matter, the jury was very versed in water rights, ditches, pastures, hay, etc . 
. Juror Number 540 had experience driving large equipment, digging ditches, and laying pipe. 
Juror Number 542 had experience with irrigation, driving large equipment, digging ditches, and 
laying pipe, experience with plants and weeds in Idaho, owns property, and had owned horses. 
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Juror Number 544 had experience driving large equipment and owns property. Juror Number 
548 had experience driving large equipment and had owned horses. Juror Number 549 had 
experience with irrigation, pastures, and hay, owning acreage, driving large equipment, digging 
ditches, and laying pipe, and owns horses and livestock. Juror Number 555 had been verbally 
threatened and bullied. Juror Number 557 owns property. Juror Number 559 had experience 
driving large equipment and owns property. Juror Number 572 had experience driving large 
equipment, digging ditches, laying pipe, and owns property. Juror Number 586 had experience 
driving large equipment, had been involved in property disputes, and owns acreage and horses. 
C. Idaho Code Section 42-1207 
1. Impedence Of Flow Is Not The Sole Measure Of Damages Under 
Idaho Code Section 42-1207 
The Scotts repeatedly assert that the Brattons are not entitled to any award of 
damages, particularly under Idaho Code Section 42-1207, unless the Brattons sufficiently prove 
an impedance of the flow of water through their irrigation ditch as a direct result of the Scotts' 
unilateral relocation and alteration of the ditch. (Motion at 5-7.) According to the Scotts, 
without a showing of "impeded water flow, [the Brattons] cannot establish causation as a matter 
oflaw." (Motion at 5.) The Scotts' assertion impermissibly ignores the plain language of the 
statute and ignores Idaho Supreme Court authority that amply provides that the impedance of 
flow of water in a ditch is not the only measure of damages to consider under Idaho Code 
Section 42-1207. 
With respect to the plain language of Idaho Code Section 42-1207, said provision 
expressly provides that landowners (in this instance the Scotts) have the right, at their expense, to 
change the location or the configuration of a preexisting irrigation facility so long as the change 
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is made "in such a manner as not to impede the flow of water therein, or to otherwise injure 
any person or persons using or interested in such ditch ... " Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the 
statute's use of the disjunctive "or," creates two separate forms of impermissible harm: (1) the 
impedence of water flows, OR (2) any other form of injury that might befall a water user as a 
result of a change in his ditch. 
This is because the use and ownership of irrigation ditches implicates two 
overlapping, but separate and distinct rights: (1) the conveyance of one's own individual water 
rights and (2) a separate property interest in the integrity of the irrigation facility and its overall 
flows beyond one's own, individual water right (known as a "ditch right"). See Savage Ditch 
Water Users v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 242-243 (1993) ("It is undeniable that water and ditch 
rights are tied together in that the ditch carries the water. But they are not the same."); see also, 
Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39,47 (1951) ("[I]n this state a ditch right for the conveyance of 
water is recognized as a property right apart from and independent ofthe right to the use of water 
conveyed therein. Each may be owned, held and conveyed independently of the other."). 
Consequently, one can have an injury to his or her water rights (through impeded ditch flows), 
but one can also sustain a distinctly separate injury to their ditch rights as a result of a change in 
the ditch or irrigation facility. This is why Idaho Code Section 42-1207 contains the disjunctive 
"or," and why the statute contemplates legally cognizable injuries beyond the mere impedance of 
flow. 
Idaho Code Section 42-1207 operates to protect not only the conveyance of water, 
but also operates to protect one's property interest in the location, configuration, and integrity of 
the existing irrigation facility. See Savage Ditch Water Users and Simonson, supra. This is why 
the Savage court made the observation that while specific ditch flow (i.e., flow impedance) 
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evidence would be "vital in a water rights controversy," such evidence was not the only 
acceptable evidence to establish a legally cognizable injury (injury to one's ditch rights) under 
the statute. Id. at 243. According to the court, other fonus of injury contemplated under the 
statute included increased maintenance difficulty, forced use rotation, and other 
"inconvenience." Id. As this case does not present a "water rights controversy," but does 
present a ditch right controversy, the Brattons were not required to present evidence of impeded 
water flow. Moreover, the jury did not have to find that the Scotts' interference with the 
Brattons' irrigation ditch resulted in impeded water flow in order to award the Brattons damages 
as compensation for the separate and distinct ditch rights that the Scotts' unilaterally endeavored 
to obliterate. Under Idaho Code Section 42-1207, the Brattons could have been harmed either by 
an impedence in ditch flows OR "otherwise injured" by the Scotts' unlawful interference with 
their ditch rights-rights capable of being "owned, held and conveyed independently" of their 
underlying water rights. See, Savage Ditch Water Users and Simonson, supra. 
2. Compliance With The Statute And The Corresponding Burden Of 
Proof 
In addition to the fact that impedance of water flow is not the sole measure injury 
or damage under Idaho Code Section 42-1207, the jury was also equally entitled to award 
damages against the Scotts for their failure to secure the Brattons' written penuission prior to 
changing the Brattons' irrigation ditch. The Scotts' unilateral actions amounted to negligence 
per se given that the tenus of the statute (I.C. § 42-1207) "must be fully complied with by one 
seeking to exercise the right it confers." Simonson, 72 Idaho at 45; see also, Savage Ditch Water 
Users, 125 Idaho at 242-43. As a result, the evidentiary burden under Idaho Code Section 42-
1207 fell to the Scotts and not the Brattons, and it was the Scotts who were required to prove that 
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they had the Brattons' prior written pennission and also that they had provided the Brattons with 
a replacement ditch that did not impede the flow of water OR otherwise injure the Brattons. 
Savage Ditch Water Users, 125 Idaho at 242-43. 
The Brattons were free to set forth a number of injuries suffered as a result ofthe 
Scotts' acts, injuries that go beyond the mere impedence of flow, and the jury was free to agree 
or disagree with those alleged injuries. Put simply, the Scotts violated the plain tenns ofIdaho 
Code Section 42-1207, and the jury found it appropriate to award general damages against the 
Scotts for that violation. 
For some reason, the Scotts go to great lengths to argue the legislative history of 
Idaho Code Section 42-1207, particularly the 2002 amendments which changed the written 
pennission requirement to include the written pennission of any irrigation facility owner as 
opposed to the fonner condition requiring written pennission only in those instances where the 
facility in question was owned by an organized irrigation entity. The Scotts contend that 
the 2002 amendments "did nothing more than clarify who written pennission must be obtained 
from," and that the amendments "had nothing to do with providing additional burdens upon 
landowners who sought to change" an irrigation ditch. (Motion at 6-7.) 
First, the Scotts' analysis of the 2002 amendments to Idaho Code Section 42-1207 
does nothing to alter, excuse, or diminish the fact that they did not obtain the requisite prior 
written pennission ofthe Brattons before changing the Brattons' irrigation ditch-an express 
obligation they owed under the statute at the time of their action to the ditch. Second, the Scotts' 
contention that the 2002 amendments did nothing to place additional burdens upon landowners 
burdened by existing irrigation facilities does not make sense. In 1994 the Idaho Legislature 
amended Idaho Code Section 42-1207 to require landowners to first obtain the written 
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permission of an organized irrigation entity (i.e., a duly organized irrigation district, canal 
company, or lateral ditch water users association) before an entity-owned irrigation facility could 
be changed. Thus, the universe of required written permission was confined to facilities owned 
by organized irrigation entities only. Prior to 1994, if a subject irrigation facility was not owned 
by an organized irrigation entity, then a landowner had no duty to seek prior written permission. 
The 2002 amendments then expanded the required written permission clause of 
the statute to include all irrigation facility owners, whether they be duly organized or not. Thus, 
the number of irrigation facilities subject to the written permission requirement was no longer 
confined to only those facilities owned by organized irrigation entities. Instead, the 2002 
amendments required landowners to seek prior written permission from any and all irrigation 
facility owners-a much bigger universe of covered facilities, thereby placing a much increased 
burden upon landowners seeking to change any irrigation facility burdening their land. While 
the Brattons fail to see the import of the Scotts' attempted legislative history-based distinction, 
the Brattons do find the Scotts' contention regarding the 2002 amendments to be surprisingly 
illogical. 
D. The Propriety Of The Jury Verdict 
The jury had a first-hand opportunity to view the evidence as set forth in Smith v. 
Big Lost River: 
Smith at 392. 
The members of the jury having had the opportunity to see all the 
witnesses, observe the manner of their testimony, note their 
apparent candor and knowledge of the matter concerning which 
they were examined, were entitled to give such weight to the 
evidence introduced as in their judgment was proper. 
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In Idaho the jury may base its opinion on minimal evidence and matters of 
common experience if the evidence and experience is sufficient to allow for this verdict. Fouche 
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 107 Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345 (1984). Therefore, in Idaho jurors have 
the right to apply their own common experience in rendering their verdict. The Idaho Supreme 
Court is firmly committed to the rule that a trial court should not take a case from the jury unless, 
as a matter oflaw, no recovery can be made upon any view .... Iverson Point, Inc., v. Wirth 
Corp., 94 Idaho 43, 480 P.2d 889 (1971). 
The motions filed by the Scotts demand that the Court grant their motions because 
the jury did not have a neat quantitative formula to determine a damage award. Because the jury 
unanimously held that the Scotts' unilateral and illegal acts were the proximate cause of harm to 
the Brattons, any an all damages flowing from that "harm" can reasonably be considered general 
damages for which there is no neat quantitative formula for the jury to apply. See, Shrum, 
Gonzales, and Bentzinger, supra. In viewing the evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs, the 
jury's award of $4,250.00 as damages for the Scotts' failure to comply with the express language 
ofIdaho Code Section 42-1207 was reasonable based on the evidence, collective knowledge, and 
experienc~ of the jury. To the extent that the Scotts argue that the $2,250.00 ditch restoration-
related damage award qualifies as special or economic damages needing evidentiary support, it 
can be reasonably argued that the damage award was well within the purview and general life 
experience (i.e., common knowledge) of this Canyon County, Idaho, jury. See,' Quick, Smith, 
and Espinoza, supra. The Court will recall, as set forth supra, that during voir dire many 
members of the jury had actual experience with digging ditches, maintaining ditches, easements, 
irrigation, and the operation of large equipment. 
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It is common knowledge that Canyon County, Idaho remains largely agricultural 
and pastoral. As a result, many of the jurors had extensive first-hand knowledge of flood 
irrigation practices, surface water delivery facilities, and pastures. See, Quick, Smith, and 
Espinoza, supra. Because jurors bring with them their general life experiences, and a 
corresponding sense of what is and is not reasonable in light of those life experiences, they are 
qualified to estimate the costs of restoring the Brattons' irrigation ditch to its former condition 
and location. 
The damage awards are reasonable, not nominal, and are not of such amount to 
shock the consciousness. In fact, the awards are very accurate and certainly support the fact that 
said awards were based on the evidence and the jury's collective knowledge and experience, and 
are well within the confines of the law. 
Further, it is well established in Idaho that the Court should not disturb a verdict 
unless as a matter of law no recovery can be made upon any view . .. . Iverson Point, Inc. In 
ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a directed verdict, the Court may 
not weigh the evidence or resolve the conflict therein or determine what conclusion should have 
been drawn therefrom .... Kaser v. Hornback, 75 Idaho 24 at 27,265 P.2d 788 at 989; Ness v. 
West Coast, Inc. , 90 Idaho 111 (1965). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing, the Brattons respectfully request that the Court deny the Scotts' 
Motion for a Directed Verdict and their alternative Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict in their entirety. 
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1o-t.. DATED this __ day of October, 2008. 
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
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JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT 
(husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, MOTION 
FOR MISTRIAL AND MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT 
This matter came before the Court on October 16, 2008 on Defendants' Motion for 
Directed Verdict, Motion for Mistrial and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
The Court, having reviewed the briefing submitted by the parties and considered oral argument 
and being fully advised in the premises, hereby ORDERS and this does ORDER that: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is GRANTED for 
the reasons set forth by the Court at the October 16, 2008 hearing; 
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2. Defendants' Motion for Mistrial was withdrawn by Defendants' counsel based 
upon the Court's ruling on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and is 
therefore moot; and 
3. Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict is also moot based upon the Court's 
ruling on Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
DATED: NOV 1 7 zooa 2008. n 
Renae J. Hoff 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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JOHN R. SCOTT and JACKIE G. SCOTT 
(husband and wife), 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 0706821C 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND FEES 
Defendants Jo1m R. Scott and Jackie G. Scott, ("Defendants"), by and through their 
attorneys of record, Perkins Coie LLP, submit the following Memorandum of Costs and Fees 
pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Ru1es of Civil Procedure. This Memorandum is supported by 
the records and files herein and the Affidavit of Shelly H. Cozakos in Support of Defendants' 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees to be filed. 
Defendants seek costs and fees pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Ru1es of Civil Procedure, 
and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and 10-1210. Defendants are clearly the prevailing party in 
this litigation as evidenced by the jury verdict forms entered in this matter and the Court's Order 
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granting Defendants' Motion fo~ Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Additionally, as set 
forth below, Plaintiffs pursued this litigation frivolously and without'foundation and an award of 
attorney's fees is appropriate against them in this matter. 
A. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(I)(C) and 54(d)(I)(D) Costs. 
Defendants incurred the following items of cost: 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(I)(C) and I.C. § 10-1210 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
a Court Filing Fees $58.00 
b. Fees for service of anypleadinR $374.00 
c. Costs for trial exhibits $449.22 
d. Expert witness fees $2,000.00 
e. Depositions taken for trial $3,022.13 
f. Charges for one copy of each deposition $1,348.29 
transcripts 
Total Charges As A Matter of Right: $7,251.64 
1.R-C.P. 54(d)(1)(D) and I.e. § 10-1210 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
g. Photocopies and printing - in house expense $492.70 
h. Travel costs $1,011.24 
i. Copy ofCDIDVD $412.10 
j. Computer Research - Westlaw $582.00 
k. Postage Expense $3.73 
Total Discretionary Costs: $2,501.77 
TOTAL COSTS: $9,753.41 
B. Attorney's Fees Requested by Defendants. 
Defendants also incurred attorney and paralegal fees as set forth below: 
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COSTS AND FEES - 2 
6568S..QOOIILEGALl4974709.1 
000499 
PERKINS COlE BOIFAX 141 004/010 
FEES INCURRED THROUGH November 13, 2008 
Attorney: 
Shelly H. Cozakos $50,987.83 
CJ"!lthia Yee-Wallace $24,721.22 
Dean B. Arnold $1,458.00 
Eric R. Bjorkman $45.90 
Paralegal: 
Kimberly L. Sampo $11,121.10 
Margaret O. Marlatt $758.25 
Legal Assistant: 
Aaron J. Bushor $60.00 
TOTAL FEES: $89,152.301 
c. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) Factors - Amount of Attorney Fees. 
1. Time and Labor Required. 
The time and labor involved in the foregoing case was significlU}t. Plaintiffs' claims were 
ever evolving and shifting and were frivolously pursued as set forth in various examples below. 
Plaintiffs' relentless pursuit of its baseless claims forced Defendants to incur substantial time and 
expense in preparing their defense for trial and in the actual trial in this matter. 
For example, in the original verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial filed in this 
case on June 28, 2007, Plaintiffs alleged that they were entitled to an implied easement by prior 
use. Compi. at 5-6. Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendants made "physical bodily threats to 
Plaintiffstl and alleged a cause of action for "tortuous [sic] stalking" against them. See CampI. at 
7. Defendants promptly filed a motion for partial dismissal seeking the dismissal of the tortious 
stalking claim on the grounds that Idaho does not recognize a private right of action for such 
1 This amount will be supplemented to add those fees incurred in preparing this Memorandwn 
and any other costs by fees in obtaining an order for Defendants' costs and fees. 
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claim. See Defs.' Memo. in SUpp. of Mot. for Partial Dismissal Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
The Court granted Defendants' motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' tortious stalking claim. See" 
Order Re: Partial Dismissal. 
Plaintiff next filed their Amended Complaint an~ Demand for Jury Trial on January 14, 
2008 ("Amended Complaint") alleging four causes of action: declaratory relief, injunction, 
negligence, and tortious interference with right of privacy. Plaintiffs once again alleged that they 
were entitled to an implied easement by prior use and that Defendants had made "physical bodily 
threats to Plaintiffs.1t Amended CompI. at 5, 7. 
Thereafter, counsel for Defendants took the deposition of Charles Bratton on February 6, . , 
2008. During his deposition, Mr. Bratton admitted that Mr. Scott did not threaten to harm him in 
any way. See Aff., of Shelly Cozakos in Opp'n to PIs.' Mot. to Amend Compi. to Add Punitive 
Damages, Ex. A. Mr. Bratton again admitted this at trial. However, despite these admissions by 
Mr. Bratton, Plaintiffs frivolously continued to advance'their claim for negligence based upon 
physical threat by the Scotts, which forced the Scotts to have to continue to defend this meritless 
claim. This claim was ultimately rejected by the jury. However, Defendants still incurred 
considerable time and expenSe in defending this claim even after it became apparent that it was 
baseless. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment 'on January 11,2008 on the 
issues of whether they were entitled to an express three-foot express easement as well as a 
twelve-foot implied easement by prior use. See Memo. in Supp. of PIs.' Mot. for Partial Summ. 
J. Defendants did not dispute that Plaintiffs were entitled to an express three-foot easement as 
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set forth in the Warranty Deed attached to the Amended Complaint. However, Defendants 
established that Plaintiffs could not meet all of the elements set forth in Thomas v. Madsen, 142 
. 
Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.2d 392, 395 (Idaho 2006) and Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 
'362 (Idaho 1999) for an implied easement. Specifically, Plaintiffs have never been able to show 
that there was "apparent continuous use long enough before conveyance of the dominant estate." 
At the February 21, 2008 hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
the Couit reviewed the pleadings and fIles and denied Plaintiffs' Motion, in part, ruling from the 
bench that Plaintiffs have no more than a three-foot express easement, and that Plaintiffs had not 
presented any evidence that they maintained a twelve foot easement prior to the separation of the 
dominant estate. See Aff. of Cynthia Y ee-Wallace in Supp. of Defs.' Second Motion in Limine, 
Ex. 1 at 6. 
Howeyer, despite Plaintiffs being unable to meet all of the elements for an implied 
easement as set forth in Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.2d 392, 395 (Idaho 2006) 
and Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (Idaho 1999), they continued to assert this 
claim through trial. Again, Defendants were forced to continue to defend a meritless claim by 
Plaintiffs. The jury ultimately found that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a twelve-foot implied 
easement and the Court also ruled as such following the trial on the issue. 
At trial, Plaintiffs were precluded from presenting evidence regarding their damages 
because they failed to disclose the same in discovery. Thus, despite the fact that Plaintiffs did 
not present any evidence on any amount of damages, Plaintiffs continued to pursue its damage 
claims which completely lacked foundation. This again was another baseless action taken by 
, 
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Plaintiffs which forced Defendants to expend significant time and expense defending in this 
matter. 
2. The Novelty and Difficnlty of the Questions. 
Within a few of weeks before trial, Plaintiffs began presenting various ditch statutes to be 
advanced at trial and raised andlor argued various water law issues, which Defendants had to 
respond to and defend against within a very short time. Thus, the facts and procedural history of 
this case made the difficulty of the questions in this matter an ever evolving process. 
3. The Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly and the 
Experience and Ability of the Attorney in the Particular Field of Law. 
The skill required to perform the legal services properly in this case necessitated having 
attorneys who are experienced in litigation and trial work perform services, as this matter 
proceeded to a six-day trial. 
4. The Prevailing Charges for Like Work. 
As set forth in the Mfidavit of Shelly H. Cozakos filed concurrently herewith, the 
attorney's fees incurred by the Defendants are consistent with comparable services and rates in the 
State ofIdaho for similar work. 
5. . Whether the Fee is Fixed or Contingent. 
The fees charged in this matter were charged at an hourly rate. 
6. The Time Limitations Imposed By the Client or Circumstances of the Case. 
This case was originally set for trial in June of2008. Defendants agreed to move the trial 
up to April of2008 because it was believed that the issues were straightforward. See Aff. of 
Shelly Cozakos in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate Trial Setting filed on March 10, 2008. Defendants 
moved to vacate the trial in March of 2008 due to the Plaintiffs failure to accommodate -
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discovery and to test the accuracy of the Plaintiffs' assertion that they could not adequate water 
to the pasture, from which they were seeking extensive damages. The Court granted this Motion. 
Almost immediately after the Court granted Defendants' motion to vacate the trial, 
Plaintiffs filed a second request for trial setting and set a status conference to set a new date for 
trial on May 20, 2008. The Court thereafter entered its Order Resetting Case for Trial and 
Pretrial on June 27, 2008, which Order was mailed to the parties on June 30, 2007. Again, this 
Order set the discovery cutoff approximately seven (7) days away and set the trial to begin in 
approximately two months. The Court extended the discovery cutoff through August 15, 2008 
and trial began approximately two weeks later on September 3,2008. 
7. Remaining Relevant Factors Under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
Essentially, .Plaintiffs walked away from this case with nothing more than the express 
easement granted to them in the Warranty Deed at issue, which Defendants did not dispute. 
Defendants walked away in this case with no liability whatsoever to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were 
seeking well over $100,000.00 in damages in this case, but walked away with no money 
damages at all. Thus, given the allegations at issue and the results obtained, Defendants are 
clearly the prevailing parties in this litigation. Additionally, given the frivolous nature and 
pursuit of Plaintiffs' claims, attorney's fees and costs are also appropriate in this matter. 
Defendants therefore seek an award of costs in the amount of$9,753.41 and attorney fees in 
the amountof$89,152.30. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND FEES - 7 
6568S-0001ILEGAL14974709.! 
000504 
12/01/2008 17:41 FAX 208343 PERKINS COlE BOIFAX 141 009/010 
Defendants will file a legal memorandwn with additional authority should Plaintiffs file a 
motion to disallow Defendants' costs and attorney's fees consistent ,vith Rules 54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Oral argument is requested if this matter is contested by Plaintiffs. 
DATED: December 1, 2008. 
PERKINS COlE LLP 
To the best of my knowledge and belief the costs and attorney's fees set forth herein are 
correct and the costs claimed are in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(d). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on December 1,2008, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be.forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the methodes) indicated 
below, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to the following person(s): 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
MOFF AlT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK 
& ~IELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., IOthFl. 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise,ID 83701 
FAX: 385-5384 
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